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INTRODUCTION 
When one thinks about discrimination, blatant acts or bad motives 
usually come to mind.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title 
VII”) protects against this type of intentional discrimination in the 
workplace through its disparate treatment provision.1  Title VII also, 
however, imposes liability even in situations where the employer acts 
without bad intentions.2  An employer may be liable simply because 
one group passes a neutral promotion test or meets a hiring 
qualification at a substantially higher rate than other groups, even 
when the selection criterion applies to everyone and is not devised to 
                                                 
 1. Congress enacted section 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to 
provide protections against employment discrimination by providing as follows:   
(a) Employer Practices.  It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employments, because of 
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex,  or national origin; or (2) to limit, 
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way 
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because 
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.   
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 2. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (stating that even 
good intentions are not a defense when an employer’s selection criteria that are not 
job related cause an adverse effect).   
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disadvantage one group over another.3  Nevertheless, if an employer’s 
neutral employment practice causes a disproportionate impact on a 
racial group or other protected class, it is a prima facie violation of 
Title VII’s disparate impact provision.4  The employer must defend 
the charge by showing that the employment practice is job related 
and a business necessity.5  Mounting a defense may involve validating 
the test or selection criterion, which can cost $100,000–$400,000.6  
Even after an employer validates a business practice, the employer 
may still be liable if there are other equally effective alternatives that 
have less adverse effect.7 
Consequently, the employer may be concerned about the racial 
composition of its employees and may make race-conscious 
employment decisions to avoid disparate impact liability.  To the 
extent that employers feel induced by the disparate impact provision 
to make such decisions, it is possible that the provision violates the 
Equal Protection Clause because it encourages employers to act on 
the basis of race.  
In Ricci v. DeStefano,8 the city of New Haven faced this very 
predicament and decided to void a promotion test given to 
firefighters because it was concerned about disparate impact liability.9  
A disproportionate number of African Americans and Hispanics who 
took the test failed.10  Under the four-fifths rule, a Guideline enforced 
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), 
disparate impact exists when the selection or pass rate of one group is 
less than eighty percent of the most successful group.11  Had the 
minority firefighters sued, they would have been able to show a prima 
facie case of disparate impact based simply on the numbers.12  This 
potential litigation led the city to discard the test results.13  
Consequently, Caucasian firefighters and a Hispanic firefighter who 
                                                 
 3. See id. at 431–32 (discussing the lack of discriminatory intent in designing 
tests or criteria for promotion). 
 4. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2198 (2010).   
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(B)(ii); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
 6. See infra note 164 (discussing costs of validating selection criteria).  
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. 
 8. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 
 9. Id. at 2664. 
 10. Id. at 2677–78. 
 11. EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) 
(2010). 
 12. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677–78.  On the lieutenant examination, the pass rate for 
each racial group was the following:  58.1 percent for Caucasians, 31.6 percent for 
African Americans, and 20 percent for Hispanics.  Id. at 2678.  On the captain 
examination, the pass rate for Caucasians was 64 percent and for Hispanics and 
African Americans was 37.5 percent.  Id. 
 13. Id. at 2664. 
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passed the test, and would likely have been promoted, sued.14  These 
plaintiffs alleged that the city’s action violated Title VII’s disparate 
treatment provision and the Equal Protection Clause.15 
In Ricci, the Court resolved the disparate treatment issue under 
Title VII16 but did not address whether the disparate impact provision 
violates the Equal Protection Clause.17  Justice Scalia observed that the 
Supreme Court’s resolution “merely postpone[d] the evil day on 
which the Court will have to confront the question:  Whether, or to 
what extent, are the disparate-impact provisions of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 consistent with the Constitution’s guarantee 
of equal protection?  The question is not an easy one.”18   
This Article completes the initial inquiry I embarked upon to 
answer this difficult question.19  In my prior work, I identified and 
examined six compelling interests that might be asserted to justify the 
disparate impact provision’s racial classifications under an Equal 
Protection Clause challenge:  remedying past discrimination, 
smoking out discrimination (intentional or unconscious), obtaining 
the benefits of diversity, providing role models, satisfying an 
operational need, and providing equal employment opportunity by 
removing barriers.20  I concluded that removing barriers to 
employment might provide the strongest defense for the disparate 
impact provision.21  This Article will explore whether the disparate 
impact provision’s use of racial classifications is narrowly tailored to 
achieve these compelling interests.  Although Title VII protects 
employees from discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, 
                                                 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 2681 (holding that the city needed to show a “strong basis in evidence” 
that its selection process would cause a potential disparate impact violation, which 
the city lacked).  
 17. The Court stated: 
Our statutory holding does not address the constitutionality of the measures 
taken here in purported compliance with Title VII.  We also do not hold that 
meeting the strong-basis-in-evidence standard would satisfy the Equal 
Protection Clause in a future case.  As we explain below, because 
respondents have not met their burden under Title VII, we need not decide 
whether a legitimate fear of disparate impact is ever sufficient to justify 
discriminatory treatment under the Constitution.   
Id. at 2676. 
 18. Id. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 19. See Eang L. Ngov, War and Peace Between Title VII’s Disparate Impact Provision 
and the Equal Protection Clause:  Battling for a Compelling Interest, 42 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 
1, 8(2010). 
 20. See id. at 8–9. 
 21. See id. at 88 (discussing the removal of barriers as a compelling interest 
because it affords people economic liberty and equality).  
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sex, or national origin, this Article focuses on racial classifications, 
and a discussion of other groups is beyond its scope. 
Commentators have focused on other constitutional issues raised 
by the disparate impact provision,22 but none have explored this 
particular constitutional inquiry—whether the disparate impact 
provision is narrowly tailored to pass strict scrutiny should “the evil 
day” come when an Equal Protection Clause challenge is made.  In 
fact, little scholarship has been written about narrow tailoring 
generally.23 
It is surprising that there is a dearth of scholarship discussing 
narrow tailoring given its significance in the evaluation of 
governmental actions that affect equal protection and individual 
rights.24  It is said that strict scrutiny is “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in 
fact,”25 but a review of the Supreme Court’s equal protection cases 
reveals that perhaps strict scrutiny is fatal because of narrow tailoring.  
When governmental use of racial classifications is challenged under 
the Equal Protection Clause, strict scrutiny requires that the 
government have a compelling purpose and that the racial 
classifications be narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose.26  The 
asserted governmental purpose may either be remedial (to remedy 
past discrimination) or nonremedial (for some purpose other than to 
remedy past discrimination).  The narrow tailoring requirement has 
been particularly fatal in cases involving nonremedial interests.  
Korematsu v. United States27 and Grutter v. Bollinger28 are among the few 
                                                 
 22. Much scholarship has been written about the validity of laws that prohibit 
disparate impact, without a showing of intent, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment or the Commerce Clause, and about whether neutral state action that 
has a discriminatory effect but lacks a discriminatory intent violates the Equal 
Protection Clause.  The latter point was raised by Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 
235, 237, 238–39 (1976).  See Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact:  
Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 494–95 (2003) (discussing the Court’s treatment 
of statutory disparate impact standards in Washington v. Davis).   
 23. See Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don’t Tell, Don’t Ask:  Narrow Tailoring After 
Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517, 518 (2007) (discussing how Grutter v. Bollinger 
and Gratz v. Bollinger changed the narrow tailoring analysis); Ian Ayres, Narrow 
Tailoring, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1781, 1782 (1996) (considering the types of affirmative 
action programs that would pass the narrow tailoring requirement). 
 24. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (establishing 
that local, state, or federal government action that implicates rights bestowed by the 
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause or Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
Clause will be reviewed with strict scrutiny). 
 25. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword:  In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court:  A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 
(1972). 
 26. Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 227. 
 27. 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (invoking national security concerns for the 
government’s racial classifications during the internment of Japanese Americans). 
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cases involving nonremedial interests to survive strict scrutiny’s 
requirement for narrow tailoring, but in light of the universal 
condemnation of Korematsu,29 Grutter is the more viable example.  
This Article explores whether the disparate impact provision can 
survive strict scrutiny’s narrow tailoring requirement by examining 
the factors considered by the Court in evaluating this requirement.30  
This Article begins by briefly tracing the development of the 
disparate impact provision and the four-fifths rule in Part I and 
explaining how the two are related.  Part II discusses the significance 
of narrow tailoring and the factors used to evaluate whether the 
narrowly tailored requirement is met. 
In Part III, this Article examines the first factor:  whether the 
enforcement of the four-fifths rule operates like a quota and draws a 
line on the basis of race,31 or operates as a permissible goal, like in 
Grutter v. Bollinger.  Part III also considers whether Grutter’s “critical 
mass” approach, which did not refer to any specified number, is 
applicable to the disparate impact provision.32  This Part concludes 
that while the law school in Grutter may assess the attainment of 
diversity without reference to a defined number of minorities, the 
critical mass approach is inapplicable because the EEOC must refer 
to some sort of threshold to maintain uniformity in enforcing the 
disparate impact provision.  Additionally, the EEOC must refer to a 
predetermined number or ratio as to what constitutes disparate 
impact in order to provide notice and due process to employers.   
Part IV considers the factors of individualized consideration and 
flexibility.  If the disparate impact provision functions as a quota, it is 
unlikely to afford flexibility or individualized consideration.  Whether 
                                                 
 28. 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (invoking an interest in diversity for the law school’s 
race-conscious admissions program). 
 29. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 275 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he Court . . . nonetheless yielded a pass for an odious, gravely injurious racial 
classification. . . . Such a classification, history and precedent instruct, properly ranks 
as prohibited.”); Farag v. United States, 587 F. Supp. 2d 436, 467 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(“[Korematsu] is now widely regarded as a black mark on our constitutional 
jurisprudence.”); Jonathan M. Justl, Note, Disastrously Misunderstood:  Judicial Deference 
in the Japanese-American Cases, 119 YALE L.J. 270, 278 n.34 (2009) (citing David Cole, 
Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 993 (2002)) (pointing out that by 2002, eight 
Supreme Court Justices have stated that Korematsu was incorrectly decided).  
 30. I acknowledge that the application of the narrowly tailored requirement is 
fact specific, and this Article will explore the question using general facts derived 
from the Supreme Court’s precedent.  This Article does not make a normative 
argument regarding whether the cases were rightly decided, but rather, accepts the 
Court’s holdings as a basis for analysis.   
 31. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289–90 (rejecting set-aside program because it was “a line 
drawn on the basis of race and ethnic status”). 
 32. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335–36 (2003) (accepting the school’s concept of “critical 
mass” as narrowly tailored to achieve diversity). 
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a race-conscious program is narrowly tailored is dependent upon 
whether race is used as the decisive factor and whether case-by-case 
considerations are possible. 
Part V examines the scope and duration of the disparate impact 
provision.  The reasonableness of a program’s scope depends upon 
its ability to encompass only similarly situated persons for purposes of 
the program and may be affected by the overinclusion or 
underinclusion of people.  Part V discusses whether the disparate 
impact provision’s probability for error would render it 
underinclusive or overinclusive and whether the provision excludes 
white males from asserting disparate impact claims, thereby making it 
underinclusive.  Part VI explores whether the provision’s racial 
classifications are reasonable in duration or seek to maintain racial 
balance.   
Part VII evaluates the final factor of whether the disparate impact 
provision’s racial classifications are necessary after consideration of 
race-neutral alternatives and whether there are race-neutral means to 
achieve the compelling purposes previously identified.  Part VIII 
assesses the likelihood of the disparate impact provision’s survival, 
taking in consideration the totality of the narrow tailoring factors.  
This Article concludes that the disparate impact provision is 
unlikely to pass the narrowly tailored requirement and risks being 
invalidated on “the evil day” when the provision is challenged under 
the Equal Protection Clause. 
I.  EVOLUTION OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY AND PROVISION 
AND THE FOUR-FIFTHS RULE 
A. The Beginnings of Disparate Impact Theory in the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court first adopted the disparate impact theory in 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,33 in which the Court considered the breadth 
of Title VII’s protection against discrimination.34  In Griggs, an 
employer required employees seeking jobs or promotions to have a 
high school diploma and to pass an intelligence test.35  These 
requirements were applied equally to Caucasians and African 
Americans36 but adversely affected African Americans.37  The Court 
invalidated the employer’s practices, concluding that the Civil Rights 
                                                 
 33. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 34. Id. at 430–31. 
 35. Id. at 427–28. 
 36. Id. at 429. 
 37. Id. 
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Act of 1964 prohibited “not only overt discrimination but also 
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”38  
Thus, employers who act with good or non-discriminatory intent must 
nevertheless justify employment practices that have an adverse effect 
by showing a business necessity related to job performance.39 
B. Congress’s Passage of the Disparate Impact Provision 
After Griggs, Congress codified disparate impact liability in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991.  Section 703 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 provides: 
(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate 
impact is established under this subchapter only if— 
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a 
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on 
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the 
respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job 
related for the position in question and consistent with business 
necessity; or 
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in 
subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment 
practice and the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative 
employment practice.40 
Section 703(k)(1) encompasses the same principles of disparate 
impact articulated in Griggs by affording employers an opportunity to 
defend their employment practice by showing that the practice is job 
related and consistent with business necessity.41   Additionally, § 703 
provides plaintiffs an opportunity at the surrebuttal stage to show that 
the employer refused to use less adverse alternatives.42   An employer’s 
refusal to use such options will render it liable under the disparate 
impact provision, even if the employer’s practice is job related and 
consistent with a business necessity.43 
C. The Four-Fifths Rule  
The EEOC is charged with enforcing Title VII.44  In 1978, the 
EEOC promulgated the four-fifths rule as part of its Guidelines on 
                                                 
 38. Id. at 431. 
 39. Id. 
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2006). 
 41. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
 42. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii). 
 43. Id. § 2000e-2(d)(1)(A). 
 44. Id. § 2000e-5(a). 
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Employee Selection Procedures45 that were designed to assist with 
compliance with federal law prohibiting discrimination and to 
“provide a framework for determining the proper use of tests and 
other selection procedures.”46  The four-fifths rule has become an 
important rule because a violation of the rule is a prima facie case of 
disparate impact.47  The four-fifths rule or eighty percent rule 
provides as follows: 
Adverse impact and the “four-fifths rule.”  A selection rate for any 
race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or 
eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will 
generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as 
evidence of adverse impact, while a greater than four-fifths rate will 
generally not be regarded by Federal enforcement agencies as 
evidence of adverse impact.48  
The Supreme Court has not yet reviewed the Guidelines49 but has 
made varying statements regarding the deference it accords to the 
Guidelines generally.  Griggs accorded the Guidelines “great 
deference,”50 explaining that “[s]ince the Act and its legislative history 
support the Commission’s construction, this affords good reason to 
treat the guidelines as expressing the will of Congress.”51  Albemarle 
Paper Co. v. Moody52 followed the deference given in Griggs,53 opining 
                                                 
 45. Jacob Van Bowen, Jr. & C. Allen Riggins, A Technical Look at the Eighty Per Cent 
Rule as Applied to Employee Selection Procedures, 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 647, 648 (1978). 
 46. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 43 Federal Register 
38290, 38296 (Aug. 25, 1978).  
 47.  See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2673, 2677–78 (2009)(“Under the 
disparate-impact statute, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie violation by showing that 
an employer uses ‘a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact 
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’”) (citing 42 U.S.C.  
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)).  The Supreme Court has stated that “[u]less and until the 
defendant [employer] pleads and proves a business-necessity defense, the plaintiff 
wins simply by showing the stated elements” of disparate impact.  Lewis v. City of 
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2198 (2010).  The four-fifths rule is an articulation of when 
the stated elements of disparate impact has been met. 
 48. The four-fifths rule also considers situations in which a ratio higher or lower 
than four-fifths may constitute evidence of adverse impact.  EEOC Guidelines on 
Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2010). See Marion Gross 
Sobol & Charles J. Ellard, Measures of Employment Discrimination:  A Statistical 
Alternative to the Four-Fifths Rule, 10 INDUS. REL. L.J. 381, 388–91 (1988) for an 
explanation of how to compute disparities using the four-fifths rule. 
 49. George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII:  An Objective Theory of 
Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1319 (1987). 
 50. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971). 
 51. Id. at 434.  
 52. 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
 53. Id. at 431 (citing Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433–34); see also Dean Booth & James L. 
Mackay, Legal Constraints on Employment Testing and Evolving Trends in the Law,  
29 EMORY L.J. 121, 128 (1980) (stating that Albemarle “represents the ‘high-water 
mark’ of deference to the 1970 Guidelines”). 
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that “[t]he EEOC Guidelines are not administrative regulations[] 
promulgated pursuant to formal procedures established by the 
Congress.  But . . . they do constitute ‘[t]he administrative 
interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency.’”54  Additionally, in 
Ricci, the Court recognized the role of the Guidelines in 
implementing the disparate impact provision.55   
Since the promulgation of the four-fifths rule in 1978,56 the 
Supreme Court has not explicitly approved or rejected this particular 
rule.  The Court in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust57 viewed the 
four-fifths rule as “not provid[ing] more than a rule of thumb for the 
courts.”58  In United States v. Paradise,59 the Court did not directly 
endorse the four-fifths rule but acknowledged that the parties agreed 
to use the four-fifths rule to determine the adverse effect of the 
selection procedure.60  The Court also provided an illustration of the 
application of the four-fifths rule through an example.61   
In Connecticut v. Teal,62 the Supreme Court implicitly endorsed the 
four-fifths rule by recognizing the district court’s uncontested finding 
that the examination failed the four-fifths rule.63  The Court provided 
a more direct discussion regarding the four-fifths rule in Ricci v. 
DeStefano, where the Court applied the rule and concluded that 
                                                 
 54. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (quoting Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971)). 
 55. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2678 (2009) (citing EEOC Guidelines 
on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D)(2008)) (applying the four-
fifths rule).  Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, stated, “Recognizing EEOC’s 
‘enforcement responsibilities’ under Title VII, we have previously accorded the 
Commission’s position respectful consideration.”  Id. at 2699–700 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
The circuit courts, however, “have accorded them a limited degree of deference.  
The circuit courts have generally accepted the guidelines as expert advice on 
technical issues, but not as binding authority on questions of statutory 
interpretations.” Rutherglen, supra note 49, at 1319. 
 56. Van Bowen & Riggins, supra note 45, at 648.  In addition to the EEOC, the 
Department of Justice, the Civil Service Commission, and the Department of Labor 
used the four-fifths rule to carry out their respective enforcement charges. Id. at  
648–49. 
 57. 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (plurality opinion). 
 58. Id. at 995 n.3. 
 59. 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (plurality opinion). 
 60. Id. at 159. 
 61. Id. at 159 n.10 (“In other words, if 60% of the white troopers who take a 
promotion test pass it, then 48% of the black troopers to whom it is administered 
must pass.”). 
 62. 457 U.S. 440 (1982). 
 63. Id. at 444 n.4; Paul Meier et al., What Happened in Hazelwood:  Statistics, 
Employment Discrimination, and the 80% Rule, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 139, 143 
(stating that the Supreme Court had implicitly approved the eighty percent rule 
when it noted that the petitioners did not contest the lower court’s finding of 
disparate impact). 
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“[t]he pass rates of minorities . . . fall well below the 80-percent 
standard set by the EEOC to implement the disparate-impact 
provision of Title VII.”64 
Additionally, there is little agreement among commentators as to 
the deference that should be accorded to the Guidelines.  One 
commentator has argued “Congress did not intend the courts to 
defer [to] the EEOC rulings.”65  Congress empowered the EEOC to 
investigate charges of employer discrimination and determine 
whether a reasonable basis exists for the charges, but not to 
determine the existence of discrimination.66   
Another commentator, however, has concluded that the 
Guidelines should be viewed as “more than informal.”67  According to 
this view, the courts have erroneously interpreted the Guidelines as 
being entitled to deference but not binding.68  As the argument goes, 
this interpretation is a mistake because the EEOC promulgated the 
Guidelines with the participation of agencies empowered with 
substantive rulemaking authority.69  Ultimately, the argument 
concludes that the Guidelines are binding because Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.70 accords greater weight 
to agency statements resulting from the rulemaking process.71 
Despite the disagreement among commentators and inconclusive 
remarks by the Court, the four-fifths rule remains critical in the 
determination of disparate impact liability.  Therefore, it is necessary 
that this Article considers how the application of the four-fifths rule 
affects the factors used in evaluating the narrowly tailored 
requirement. 
II. NARROW TAILORING  
When the government implements racially based policies, its 
policies are reviewed under strict scrutiny.72  Strict scrutiny requires 
                                                 
 64. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2678 (2009).  
 65. Michael Evan Gold, Griggs’ Folly:  An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and Origin of 
the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a Recommendation for 
Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429, 485 (1985). 
 66. Id. at 485–86. 
 67. Alfred W. Blumrosen, Society in Transition IV:  Affirmation of Affirmative Action 
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 903, 910 (1993).  
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 71. Blumrosen, supra note 67, at 910. 
 72. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[A]ll racial 
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local government actor, must be 
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny . . . .”). 
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that racial classifications be necessary to achieve a compelling 
governmental purpose.73  Strict scrutiny serves the following purposes: 
[It] “smoke[s] out” illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the 
legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use 
of a highly suspect tool . . . [and] ensures that the means chosen 
“fit” this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no 
possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate 
racial prejudice or stereotype.74  
Narrow tailoring is the component of strict scrutiny that ensures 
“the means chosen ‘fit’ [the] compelling goal.”75  The Court has 
examined a number of factors in determining whether governmental 
racial classifications are narrowly tailored76:  the use of quotas,77 the 
flexibility of the program,78 the duration of the relief,79 the scope of 
the program,80 individualized considerations,81 and the necessity of 
the program compared with the efficacy of race neutral alternatives.82  
                                                 
 73. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (explaining that all 
restrictions based on racial classification are suspect unless justified by public 
necessity).  
 74. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).  
 75. Id. 
 76. See generally Ayres & Foster, supra note 23 (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
approach to narrow tailoring after two recent decisions); Michael K. Fridkin,  
The Permissibility of Non-Remedial Justification for Racial Preferences in Public Contracting,  
24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 509, 519 (2004) (discussing the narrow tailoring issue after 
Croson).  
 77. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477, 485, 505 
(1989) (invalidating a program that set aside thirty percent of contract-award value 
to Minority Business Enterprises); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 
305, 320 (1978) (invalidating medical school’s admissions program that set aside 
sixteen seats for underrepresented minorities). 
 78. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987).  
 79. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 510 (“Proper findings in this regard are necessary to 
define both the scope of the injury and the extent of the remedy necessary to cure its 
effects. Such findings also serve to assure all citizens that the deviation from the 
norm of equal treatment of all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a 
measure taken in the service of the goal of equality itself.”); Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171. 
 80. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 506 (“The gross overinclusiveness of Richmond’s racial 
preference strongly impugns the city’s claim of remedial motivation.”). 
 81. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (“As Justice Powell made 
clear in Bakke, truly individualized consideration demands that race be used in a 
flexible, nonmechanical way.”); Croson, 488 U.S. at 508 (“Based upon proper 
findings, such programs are less problematic from an equal protection standpoint 
because they treat all candidates individually, rather than making the color of an 
applicant’s skin the sole relevant consideration.”); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 n.52 (1978) (“The denial to respondent of this right to 
individualized consideration without regard to his race is the principal evil of 
petitioner’s special admissions program.”). 
 82. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237–38 (1995) 
(pointing out that the circuit court failed to “address the question of narrow tailoring 
in terms of our strict scrutiny cases, by asking, for example, whether there was any 
consideration of the use of race-neutral means to increase minority business 
participation in government contracting” (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 507) (internal 
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Because “[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-based governmental 
action under the Equal Protection Clause,”83 evaluation of the factors 
for narrow tailoring in some instances will depend on the compelling 
purpose asserted. 
Whether the disparate impact provision must be narrowly tailored 
depends upon whether it is subject to strict scrutiny review.  
Consequently, because racial classifications may violate the Equal 
Protection Clause, a preliminary determination of whether the 
disparate impact provision implicates racial classifications is 
necessary.  Relying on Ricci, this Article assumes that Title VII’s 
disparate impact provision uses racial classifications.  In Ricci, the 
Court characterized the city’s action as “express, race-based 
decisionmaking”84 because the city voided the examination scores as a 
result of “the statistical disparity based on race.”85  The Court 
explained that “the City rejected the test results because too many 
whites and not enough minorities would be promoted were the lists 
to be certified.”86  Therefore, this Article proceeds on the premise 
that the disparate impact provision uses racial classifications because 
it induces employers to consider race when making employment 
decisions, triggering strict scrutiny.87 
                                                 
quotations omitted)); Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171 (“In determining whether race-
conscious remedies are appropriate, we look to several factors, including the 
necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies . . . .”); Wygant v. 
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986) (plurality opinion) (“The term 
‘narrowly tailored,’ . . . has acquired a secondary meaning.  More specifically, as 
commentators have indicated, the term may be used to require consideration of 
whether lawful alternative and less restrictive means could have been used.  Or, as 
Professor Ely has noted, the classification at issue must ‘fit’ with greater precision 
than any alternative means.” (citing John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse 
Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 727 n.26 (1974))). 
Another factor that the Court has considered is whether the use of racial 
classifications “unduly harms members of any racial group.”  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341.  
Discussion of this factor is beyond the scope of this Article because it is not directly 
applicable to the disparate impact provision. 
 83. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327. 
 84. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2673 (2009). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 87. State action exists because Congress is requiring employers to act in a certain 
way.  See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614–16 (1989) (holding that 
regulations that authorized, but did not require, employers to administer blood and 
urine tests constituted state action because the government encouraged this 
practice). 
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III. QUOTA OR GOAL:  LINE DRAWING, A NUMBERS GAME, OR A 
MATTER OF SEMANTICS? 
The use of quotas is one factor in determining whether the 
disparate impact provision’s use of racial classifications is narrowly 
tailored.  The Court’s treatment of quotas varies depending on 
whether there is a remedial need for racial classifications.  In cases 
involving a need to remedy past discrimination, the Court has been 
more accepting of quotas.88  On the other hand, in the absence of a 
remedial need, the Court has generally rejected quotas but has 
permitted goals.89 
This Part first provides a brief legislative history of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and its 1991 amendment codifying the disparate impact 
provision.  This Part also explores whether the disparate impact 
provision can be properly characterized as a quota or a permissible 
goal in order to determine if the provision is narrowly tailored.  The 
analysis proceeds by accepting the Court’s jurisprudence regarding 
quotas because a normative discussion of quotas is beyond the scope 
of this Article.  
A. Brief Legislative History Showing Apprehension of Quotas 
Legislative history reveals that, prior to the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, critics were concerned that the Act would require 
quotas.90  “[M]any opponents of Title VII argued that an employer 
could be found guilty of discrimination under the statute simply 
                                                 
 88. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 (1987) (“It is now well 
established that government bodies, including courts, may constitutionally employ 
racial classifications essential to remedy unlawful treatment of racial or ethnic groups 
subject to discrimination.”); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. 
EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 479 (1986) (emphasizing the measure’s automatic termination 
once the remedial need ends); Richard L. Barnes, Quotas as Satin-lined Traps, 29 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 865, 867 (1995) (“Judicially ordered quotas continue to have a place in 
remedying discrimination . . . .”);  Martha Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality 
Under Title VII:  Disparate Impact Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle,  
31 UCLA L. REV. 305, 363–64 (1983) (“Indeed, judicially imposed quotas designed to 
remedy unlawful discrimination and affirmative action quotas voluntarily instituted 
by employers to serve as insulation from possible Title VII liability are commonplace 
and have generally fared well under attack in litigation.”). 
 89. C.f. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326–27 (2003) (discussing the difficulty 
in classifying measures as remedial or illegitimate); City of Richmond v. Croson,  
488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (emphasizing the impossibility of determining whether the 
measure at issue was remedial); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 
(1978) (explaining that a measure with without a remedial purpose was unjustified 
because it imposed disadvantages on persons who bore no responsibility for the 
harms suffered by the measure’s beneficiaries).  
 90. See Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 453–65 (describing the congressional 
debates surrounding the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and tracing the Act’s development); 
Gold, supra note 65, at 503–07. 
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because of a racial imbalance in his work force, and would be 
compelled to implement racial ‘quotas’ to avoid being charged with 
liability.”91  Similar objections to quotas resurfaced during the passage 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.92  “[C]ounsel to three of the key 
Senate sponsors” revealed that the disparate impact provision of the 
proposed Act triggered the quota objection because the provision 
attempted to codify both liability for unintentional discrimination 
and the business necessity defense.93 
Senator Orin Hatch, for example, expressed his concerns:  
[W]hat kind of a society do we really wish to establish? . . . [I]s it a 
society that . . . requires every job in America to match perfectly the 
numerical mix of the surrounding, relevant labor pool; a society 
where every employment policy is governed by numerical quotas?94 
Ultimately, the fear of quotas led President George H. W. Bush to 
veto the Civil Rights Act of 1990.95  President Bush stated, “Primarily 
through provisions governing cases in which employment practices 
are alleged to have unintentionally caused the disproportionate 
exclusion of members of certain groups, the [1990 Act] creates 
powerful incentives for employers to adopt hiring and promotion 
quotas.”96 
                                                 
 91. Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 463. 
 92. For discussions of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see 
generally Roger Clegg, Introduction:  A Brief Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, 54 LA. L. REV. 1459 (1994); Andrew M. Dansicker, A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing:  
Affirmative Action, Disparate Impact, Quotas and the Civil Rights Act, 25 COLUM. J.L. & 
SOC. PROBS. 1 (1991); Gary A. Moore & Michael K. Braswell, “Quotas” and the 
Codification of the Disparate Impact Theory:  What Did Griggs Really Say and Not Say?,  
55 ALB. L. REV. 459, 472–79 (1991).   
For an insider’s perspective see C. Boyden Gray, Disparate Impact:  History and 
Consequences, 54 LA. L. REV. 1487, 1491 (1994); Peter M. Leibold et al., Civil Rights Act 
of 1991:  Race to the Finish—Civil Rights, Quotas, and Disparate Impact in 1991, 45 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1043 (1993).  Peter Leibold, Stephen Sola, and Reginald Jones 
“were intimately involved in the negotiations surrounding the 1991 bill” as counsel to 
senators.  Id. at 1043.  C. Boyden Gray played a key role during the negotiations of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 by serving as Counsel to the President of the United 
States. Gray, supra, at 1487.  
 93. Leibold et al., supra note 92, at 1043–44. 
 94. Kingsley R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991:  A “Quota Bill,” a Codification 
of Griggs, a Partial Return to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
287, 288 n.5 (1993) (quoting 136 CONG. REC. 29,527 (1990) (statement of Sen. 
Hatch)). 
 95. See Douglas W. Kmiec, The 1991 Civil Rights Act:  A Constitutional, Statutory, and 
Philosophical Enigma, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911, 913–14 (1993) (discussing the 
failure of the 1990 Act). 
 96. Id. at 913–14 (quoting Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval 
the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1437, 1438 (Oct. 22, 1990)).  
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Interestingly, the Democrats in both the House of Representatives 
and Senate had adopted anti-quota language in the 1990 bill.97  Later, 
as a result of compromise, the anti-quota language was deleted.98  
Senator Dole and the President explained that the anti-quota 
language was omitted because it was unnecessary, as “the bill was not 
a quota bill at all.”99  In November 1991, after a tumultuous two-year 
battle, the President signed the Civil Rights Act of 1991.100 
B. The Court’s Treatment of Quotas for Non-Remedial Need 
Except for Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court has invalidated most cases 
involving governmental racial classifications for nonremedial need, 
purposes other than remedying past discrimination, under strict 
scrutiny’s narrowly tailored prong.  In Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke101 the Supreme Court invalidated a medical school’s 
admissions program, which set aside sixteen out of one hundred seats 
in its entering class for minorities.102  Although the Court recognized 
that the medical school’s goal of advancing diversity was a compelling 
interest,103 the Court held that the program was not narrowly 
tailored.104 
In its defense, the medical school attempted to distinguish its 
program from a quota.  A quota, according to the medical school, is 
“a requirement which must be met but can never be exceeded, 
regardless of the quality of the minority applicants.”105  The medical 
school argued that its admissions process was not a quota because 
there was “no ‘floor’ under the total number of minority students 
admitted; completely unqualified students [would] not be admitted 
simply to meet a ‘quota.’  Neither [was] there a ‘ceiling,’ since an 
unlimited number could be admitted through the general admissions 
process.”106 
The Court rejected this “semantic distinction” because sixteen seats 
were reserved for minority applicants without competition from white 
applicants.107  White applicants could vie only for eighty-four seats 
                                                 
 97. See Blumrosen, supra note 67, at 914 (discussing the disappearance of the 
anti-quota language adopted by both houses of Congress). 
 98. Blumrosen, supra note 67, at 914. 
 99. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 100. Leibold et al., supra note 92, at 1043. 
 101. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 102. Id. at 289. 
 103. Id. at 314. 
 104. Id. at 320. 
 105. Id. at 288 n.26. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 289. 
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while minorities were able to compete for all one hundred seats.108  
The Court concluded, “[w]hether this limitation is described as a 
quota or a goal, it is a line drawn on the basis of race and ethnic 
status.”109 
The Court, however, later found the distinction between a quota 
and a goal significant.110  In Grutter, the Court upheld a law school’s 
admissions program that considered race as one factor to advance the 
school’s objective of attaining a “critical mass” of diverse students in 
its entering class.111  The Court declared that “[t]o be narrowly 
tailored, a race-conscious admissions program cannot use a quota 
system” and validated the law school’s program because it did not rely 
on a rigid quota.112  As the Court defined:  
[A] quota is a program in which a certain fixed number or 
proportion of opportunities are reserved exclusively for certain 
minority groups.  Quotas impose a fixed number or percentage 
which must be attained, or which cannot be exceeded, and insulate 
the individual from comparison with all other candidates for the 
available seats.113 
In contrast, “a permissible goal requires only a good-faith effort to 
come within a range demarcated by the goal itself, and permits 
consideration of race as a plus factor in any given case while still 
ensuring that each candidate competes with all other qualified 
applicants.”114  Ultimately, the Court decided that the admissions 
program fell within a permissible goal.115  
Additionally, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,116 the Court 
invalidated a program that required contractors who were awarded 
city contracts to subcontract at least thirty percent of the award to 
Minority Business Enterprises.117  The city could not show a remedial 
                                                 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id.  The Court compared the medical school’s program to Harvard’s, 
pointing out that “[i]n Harvard College admissions the Committee did not set target-
quotas for the number of blacks, or of musicians, football players, physicists or 
Californians to be admitted in a given year.”  Id. at 316 (citation omitted).  
By implication, the Court seemed to view the program in Bakke as a quota. 
 110. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 335–36 (2003). 
 111. See id. at 318 (defining critical mass as “‘meaningful numbers’ or  
‘meaningful representation,’ which [the school] understood to mean a number that 
encourages underrepresented minority students to participate in the classroom and 
not feel isolated”). 
 112. Id. at 334.  
 113. Id. at 335 (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted). 
 114. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).  
 115. See id. at 335–36 (“The Law School’s goal of attaining a critical mass of 
underrepresented minority students does not transform its program into a quota.”). 
 116. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 117. Id. at 477, 485–86.   
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need for the program because there was no evidence of past 
discrimination by the city.118  The Court concluded that the thirty 
percent figure was a “rigid racial quota”119 that was not narrowly 
tailored because race neutral alternatives were available and it 
unrealistically assumed that minorities will select a particular job in 
proportion to their representation in the local population.120  
C. The Court’s Treatment of Quotas for Remedial Need 
Quotas designed to remedy past discrimination have had greater 
success in meeting the narrow tailoring requirement.  For example, 
in Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ International Ass’n v. EEOC,121 
(“Sheet Metal Workers”) the Court upheld a “membership goal” 
imposed as remedial relief for prior union discrimination against 
African Americans as being narrowly tailored.122  Due to the union’s 
“long and persistent pattern of discrimination” that had “consistently 
and egregiously violated Title VII,”123 the district court established a 
twenty-nine percent non-white membership goal.124  The Court 
concluded that the goal was necessary to redress the “lingering effects 
of past discrimination.”125   
The flexibility of the goal, evidenced by the district court’s 
adjustments in response to changes in the union, was another 
persuasive factor in Sheet Metal Workers.126  The Court highlighted that 
the district court’s flexibility in adjusting the deadline for achieving 
the membership goal was evidence that the goal was not a device for 
attaining and maintaining racial balance, but “rather [w]as a bench 
mark against which the court could gauge [the union’s] efforts to 
remedy past discrimination.”127  Additionally, the temporary nature of 
the goal—that the program would end as soon as the union achieved 
                                                 
 118. Id. at 480.  
 119. Id. at 499. 
 120. Id. at 507. 
 121. 478 U.S. 421 (1986). 
 122. Id. at 476–77.  The court ordered goal in Sheet Metal Workers survived 
challenges under equal protection and Title VII.  See id. at 479–80 (stating that 
petitioners raised a claim under the “equal protection component of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment”). 
 123. Id. at 433. 
 124. Id. at 432.  
 125. Id. at 477.  The Court did not review the appropriateness of the twenty-nine 
percent figure because that figure had been set for at least ten years, the court of 
appeals had affirmed that figure twice before, and the parties did not raise this 
particular issue for the Court’s review.  Id. at 441.  
 126. Id. at 477–78. 
 127. Id.  
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the sought after membership—was significant in the Court’s analysis 
of whether the goal was narrowly tailored.128  
In United States v. Paradise,129 the Court upheld another “goal” 
intended to redress past discrimination against African Americans by 
the Alabama Department of Public Safety.130  The district court 
ordered the hiring of one African American trooper for each 
Caucasian trooper until the state-wide percentage of African 
American troopers reached twenty-five percent.131  Concluding that 
the one-for-one requirement was “flexible, waivable, and 
temporary,”132 the Court explained that it was not a goal, but rather 
the pace at which the twenty-five percent goal would be met,133 similar 
to the objective in Sheet Metal Workers.134 
D. Does the Disparate Impact Provision Impose or Operate as a Quota? 
The disparate impact provision does not explicitly require quotas,135 
and in fact, § 703(j) of Title VII disavows any requirement for 
preferences on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, or 
religion.136  But this disavowal is not sufficient to dispel the suggestion 
that the provision operates as a quota.   
An argument can be made that when the disparate impact 
provision is applied, it falls within the definition of “quota”137 
provided in Bakke and Grutter.138  Similar to the quota in Bakke,139 the 
disparate impact provision reserves a percentage exclusively for other 
racial groups without competition.  Under the four-fifths rule, if 
                                                 
 128. Id. at 479. 
 129. 480 U.S. 149, 153 (1986). 
 130. Id. at 185–86.  The Court also upheld quotas in United Steelworkers v. Weber, 
443 U.S. 193 (1979), but this Article does not rely on Weber because it involved a 
voluntary quota agreement entered into by private parties lacking state action and 
the parties raised only a Title VII claim, not an Equal Protection challenge.  See id. at 
197 (describing a collective bargaining agreement between employer and union).  
 131. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 154–55. 
 132. Id. at 178. 
 133. Id. at 179.  
 134. Id. at 180 (citing Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 487–88 (Powell, J., 
concurring)). 
 135. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“To 
be sure, the disparate-impact laws do not mandate imposition of quotas . . . .”).  
 136. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (2006). 
 137. I do not use “quota” as a pejorative but rather as a label for programs that are 
not permissible goals.  
 138. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311 (2003) (identifying race as a factor 
in determining admission to a law school); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265, 269–70 (1978) (noting the set-aside program was implemented to ensure a 
specified number of minority students were admitted to the medical school 
program). 
 139. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 275 (describing the medical school’s policy of admitting 
a prescribed number of minority students). 
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there is at least twenty percent separation between the selection rate 
of the highest performing racial group and other groups, then a 
plaintiff can prove a prima facie case of disparate impact.140  In this 
way, the disparate impact provision essentially reserves a 
representation rate that is eighty percent of the most successful 
group’s selection rate.  Additionally, the Grutter Court permitted 
universities to “consider race or ethnicity only as a ‘plus’ in a 
particular applicant’s file, without insulating the individual from 
comparison with all other candidates for the available seats.”141  The 
disparate impact provision’s twenty percent reservation insulates 
groups from comparison, contrary to the program approved in 
Grutter.142   
On the other hand, it is possible to characterize the disparate 
impact provision as a permissible goal like Grutter’s critical mass.143  
One can argue that the disparate impact provision functions like a 
goal because like critical mass, the disparate impact provision does 
not establish a set number needed to meet the goal.144  Even though 
the four-fifths rule equates to eighty percent, it is set in relation to the 
group with the highest pass rate.145  Consider two examples.  First, if 
Caucasians had the highest pass rate in Ricci with one hundred 
percent passing the test, then there would be a prima facie case of 
disparate impact if less than eighty percent of African American 
firefighters passed.  Second, assume again that Caucasians had the 
highest pass rate, but with only fifty percent passing the test.  In this 
case, there would be a disparate impact if less than forty percent of 
African American firefighters passed.  Thus, there is no “quota” 
because the number of people required to pass in order to avoid 
prima facie liability would depend on the group with the highest pass 
rate.   
Also, the disparate impact provision can be characterized as a 
permissible goal because it allows consideration of race plus other 
                                                 
 140. See Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2197 (2010) (holding that a 
claim is established by showing that an employer “uses a particular employment 
practice that causes a disparate impact” on one of the prohibited bases); EEOC 
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2010). 
 141. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 142. See id. (explaining that the policy allowed race to be considered in “a flexible, 
nonmechanical way”). 
 143. See id. at 315–16 (describing the law school’s goal of achieving a critical mass 
of diverse students to enrich education).  
 144. See id. at 335 (emphasizing that the law school did not maintain specified 
numbers for minority enrollment).  
 145. EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) 
(2010). 
NGOV.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 2/24/2011  5:39 PM 
2011] WHEN THE “EVIL DAY” COMES 555 
factors, similar to critical mass.  The provision does not rest solely on 
race but takes into consideration other factors, such as whether the 
employment practice is justified by business necessity and is job 
related and whether other equally effective alternatives with fewer 
adverse effects exist.146  
There are, however, several problems with equating the disparate 
impact provision to critical mass.  First, although there is no 
predetermined number set by the disparate impact provision, there is 
a predetermined percentage or proportion established by the four-
fifths rule that must be met to avoid a prima facie case of disparate 
impact.147  In contrast, the critical mass concept approved by the 
Grutter Court was not quantified by numbers or percentages.148   
Second, the disparate impact provision does not allow for “a range 
demarcated by the goal itself” like with critical mass.149  In an 
admissions program, the number of students that are needed for a 
critical mass of diverse students in the entering class can change from 
year to year.150  But the proportion or percentage set by the four-fifths 
rule needed to satisfy the disparate impact provision is fixed not only 
from year to year (unless the EEOC passes new Guidelines), but also 
fixed for all employers. 
Third, the disparate impact provision differs from critical mass 
because critical mass affords consideration of race plus other factors.  
Although the disparate impact provision considers other factors for 
ultimately determining liability, race is the only consideration at the 
initial stage.  A plaintiff can show a prima facie case of disparate 
impact merely on race alone.  “Unless and until the defendant 
[employer] pleads and proves a business-necessity defense, the 
plaintiff wins simply by showing the stated elements” of disparate 
impact.151  If an employment practice fails the four-fifths rule, an 
employer must defend against a prima facie case of disparate 
impact.152  Although the disparate impact provision affords employers 
the defense of business necessity and job relatedness, it may be of 
limited consolation because the costs associated with mounting the 
defense can be prohibitive.153   
                                                 
 146. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2006). 
 147. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D). 
 148. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318–19. 
 149. Id. at 335 (quoting Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 
478 U.S. 421, 495 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 150. Id. at 336. 
 151. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2198 (2010). 
 152. Id. 
 153. To mount a defense, an employer would need to validate its selection 
criteria, at the very least, which would require considerable expense of time and 
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Fourth, the disparate impact provision is distinguishable from 
critical mass because it lacks a demonstrated need for the quota set by 
the provision.  In Grutter, the Court approved critical mass because 
the school justified that a critical mass of diverse students was integral 
to the school’s educational mission.154  In contrast, in Parents Involved 
in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,155 (“Parents 
Involved”) the school board’s failure to show a need for the sought-
after level of diversity led to the Court’s conclusion that the board’s 
student assignment was not narrowly tailored.156  In that case, the 
school board used each school’s racial balance as one factor in 
placing students.157  If the school’s racial distribution was not within 
ten percentage points of the district’s white to non-white racial 
composition, then a student who would contribute to the school’s 
racial balance would be assigned to the school.158  The Court 
                                                 
money.  For example, in Ricci, the city spent $100,000 to hire a testing consultant to 
develop and administer the examinations.  Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2665 
(2009).  One commentator has remarked that “[i]n theory, an employer can win an 
adverse impact case by proving that the challenged selection criterion is valid.  In 
practice, this burden can almost never be carried, and the result is that employers 
are forced to hire and promote by quotas.”  Gold, supra note 65, at 457.   
For additional discussion of the expense and challenges of validation, see Booth & 
Mackay, supra note 53; Gold, supra note 6565, at 460 n.82 (explaining that Daniel E. 
Leach, vice-chair of EEOC in 1978, estimated criterion validation costing employers 
$100,000–$400,000); Steven R. Greenberger, A Productivity Approach to Disparate 
Impact and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 72 OR. L. REV. 253, 319 (1993) (noting that 
validation tests are so exacting and demanding that smaller employers will often 
forgo the tests); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:  A Cognitive 
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
1161, 1235 (1995) (“Formal validation of even relatively straightforward objective 
selection devices is an expensive and time-consuming process, often requiring several 
years and hundreds of thousands of dollars in professional fees and employee 
time.”); Rutherglen, supra note 49, at 1317–18 (explaining that validation tests are 
expensive, costing an estimate of $100,000 and must be completed each time a test is 
used for a different job); Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense 
to the Disparate Impact Cause of Action:  Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1479, 
1543 (1996) (“For example, the cost of the most favored form of validation, criterion 
validation, has been estimated to be at least $100,000, an expense that has to be 
incurred each time a practice is used for a particular job.”); Van Bowen & Riggins, 
supra note 45, at 651 (“The burden of validation can be costly as well as impossible in 
at least some cases.”).  
For a description of the types of validation, see Booth & Mackay, supra note 53, at 
162–65; Doreen Canton, Adverse Impact Analysis of Public Sector Employment Tests:  Can a 
City Devise a Valid Test?, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 683, 691–96 (1987).   
 154. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (“Our conclusion that the Law School has a 
compelling interest in a diverse student body is informed by our view that attaining a 
diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School’s proper institutional mission, 
and that ‘good faith’ on the part of the university is ‘presumed’ absent ‘a showing to 
the contrary.’” (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318–19 
(1978)). 
 155. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 156. Id. at 726. 
 157. Id. at 710. 
 158. Id. at 712. 
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explained, “[t]he plans are tied to each district’s specific racial 
demographics, rather than to any pedagogic concept of the level of 
diversity needed to obtain the asserted educational benefits.”159   
Similarly, the disparate impact provision fails to demonstrate a 
need for the level specified by the four-fifths rule.  Researchers have 
criticized the four-fifths rule as arbitrary.160  This “arbitrariness” could 
be due to the fact that the four-fifths or eighty percent rule resulted 
from two compromises:  
(1) a desire expressed by those writing and having input into the 
Guidelines to include a statistical test as the primary step but 
knowing from an administrative point of view a statistical test was 
not possible for the FEPC consultants who had to work the 
enforcement of the Guidelines, and (2) a way to split the middle 
between two camps, the 70% camp and the 90% camp.161 
Consistent with Parents Involved, the EEOC would need to provide 
data to support the chosen eighty percent over seventy percent, 
ninety percent, or any other percentage and that the four-fifths rule 
is necessary to achieve the goal envisioned by the disparate impact 
provision.162  Absent supporting evidence for the four-fifths rule, it is, 
as the Court pointed out in Sheet Metal Workers, “completely 
unrealistic to assume that individuals of each race will gravitate with 
mathematical exactitude to each employer . . . absent unlawful 
discrimination.”163 
Additionally, even if the EEOC were to jettison the four-fifths rule 
or another variation of the rule, the disparate impact could not 
operate practically as a “goal” like critical mass.  The unique concerns 
of uniformity of enforcement as well as giving notice to prospective 
plaintiffs and defendants as to when liability may result for disparate 
impact make the critical mass approach inapplicable to disparate 
                                                 
 159. Id. at 726.  
 160. Anthony E. Boardman & Aidan R. Vining, The Role of Probative Statistics in 
Employment Discrimination Cases, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189, 189 (1983). 
 161. Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward a Coherent Test for Disparate Impact Discrimination, 
84 IND. L.J. 773, 782 n.61 (quoting DAN BIDDLE, ADVERSE IMPACT AND TEST 
VALIDATION:  A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO VALID AND DEFENSIBLE EMPLOYMENT  
TESTING 3 (2005)). 
 162. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
733 (2007) (plurality opinion) (noting the requirement of showing that a racial 
classification is necessary to achieve a stated purpose). 
 163. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 494 
(1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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impact.  Critical mass is an approach to using racial classifications 
that is unique to the educational context.164   
Critical mass has been used to describe three conditions:  
[T]he existence of a precise minimum level of the required 
material for a change to take place; a change that is sudden and 
transformative; and that the change is not simply a function of a 
minimum level of the resource but also a function of how elements 
of that resource interact with one another.165 
In the educational context, the law school in Grutter used critical 
mass to refer to “meaningful numbers” or “meaningful 
representation” needed to encourage minority participation in the 
classroom without the sense of isolation.166  In this regard, a university 
can practically operate an admissions program without a defined 
number as to when critical mass is achieved.  It would be hard to 
imagine, however, how the EEOC could enforce the disparate impact 
provision without a defined number or percentage to serve as a point 
of reference in assessing when a disproportionate adverse effect rises 
to the level of disparate impact.  First, the EEOC would need to 
establish a threshold to ensure that it uniformly enforces the 
disparate impact provision and does not violate employers’ equal 
protection rights by varying its application.167   
Second, the EEOC would also need to be wary of due process 
claims for assessing liability upon employers without giving them 
notice as to what constitutes disparate impact.  The Due Process 
Clause has been interpreted to encompass procedural and 
substantive due process.168  Procedural due process requires providing 
                                                 
 164. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978) 
(stating that the interest of diversity is compelling in the context of a university 
admissions program). 
 165. Adeno Addis, The Concept of Critical Mass in Legal Discourse, 29 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 97, 98–99 (2007).   
 166. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 318 (2003).  The concept of critical mass 
originated in science and refers to the precise minimum amount of mass needed to 
create and sustain an explosion.  Addis, supra note 165, at 98.  Professor Addis points 
out that Grutter can be criticized for imprecisely and improperly using the concept of 
critical mass because the scientific reference to critical mass is dependent upon 
ascertaining a precise minimum amount, whereas the law school in Grutter, despite 
Justice Scalia’s prodding, declined to quantify critical mass.  Id. at 125–26.  
Nonetheless, this section proceeds with an analysis of critical mass as conceptualized 
by the law school, since its interpretation of critical mass was accepted by the Court 
in Grutter.   
 167. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289–90 (“The guarantee of equal protection cannot 
mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to 
a person of another color.  If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is 
not equal.”). 
 168. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 603 (3d ed. 2009).  
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notice before a person’s life, liberty, or property can be taken away.169  
An employer would not have adequate notice if it did not have 
sufficient information to conform its behavior to the law.  Here, if the 
disparate impact provision operates without a defined threshold, like 
critical mass, employers will not know what level of disparity is 
actionable against them.  Concomitantly, without a defined threshold 
that would trigger disparate impact, prospective plaintiffs would not 
know the appropriate circumstances under which to file a disparate 
impact claim.  Thus, even if the EEOC were to proceed without the 
four-fifths rule, it would be difficult for the disparate impact provision 
to be enforced without some numerical or percentage threshold.  
Whatever the form, any threshold is likely to operate as a quota 
because it draws a line on the basis of race.170  
IV. FLEXIBILITY AND INDIVIDUALIZED DECISION MAKING  
A second factor in considering whether a program is narrowly 
tailored includes the program’s flexibility and individualized decision 
making.  A program’s flexibility and individualized decision making 
are interrelated with each other and the quota factor in that the 
characteristics relevant to the quota factor may also be relevant to the 
flexibility and individualized decision making of the program. 
A. Flexibility 
In evaluating whether remedial race-conscious measures are 
narrowly tailored, the Court has been concerned with the flexibility 
of the remedy.  In Paradise, the Court concluded that the one-for-one 
promotion quota was flexible because the plan allowed for waiver in 
the absence of qualified African American candidates.171  In Sheet 
Metal Workers, the membership goal was narrowly tailored because the 
goal was flexible—the district court twice extended the deadline and 
accommodated the union’s economic changes by adjusting the 
apprenticeship class size.172  The flexibility of the Harvard admissions 
program countenanced by Bakke allowed for variation in the weight 
accorded to a particular factor each year, as the mix of the student 
body changed.173  Similarly, the flexibility of the program in Grutter 
                                                 
 169. Id. 
 170. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 288–89. 
 171. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 177 (1987).  
 172. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421,  
487–88 (1986). 
 173. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317–18. 
NGOV.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 2/24/2011  5:39 PM 
560 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:535 
allowed for yearly fluctuation in the number of underrepresented 
minority student enrollment.174  
In contrast, the disparate impact provision does not appear to be 
flexible like the goals in Paradise, Sheet Metal Workers, Bakke, or Grutter.  
There are no waivers or exceptions to the enforcement of the 
disparate impact provision.  Additionally, the disparate impact 
provision does not allow for yearly variation based on an employer’s 
need like the Harvard plan in Bakke or the plan in Grutter.175  The 
ratio established by the four-fifths rule remains constant in each case, 
regardless of whether an employer’s needs necessitate variation.   
The constancy of the four-fifths rule is problematic for another 
reason.  The Court requires that for a race-conscious program to 
satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement, the weight placed on race 
should be no more than is necessary to achieve the compelling 
government interest.176  The four-fifths rule places the same amount 
of weight on race regardless of the compelling interest being asserted 
to justify the disparate impact provision’s racial classification.  
Whether the provision might be justified because it seeks to obtain 
the benefits of diversity, provide role models, meet operational 
needs, smoke out discrimination, or provide equal employment 
opportunities, the four-fifths rule is the only method allowed for 
achieving the desired objective.   
In Bakke177 and Grutter,178 the Court recognized the need for the 
program to vary the weight placed on racial factors.  Allowing for 
variation ensures that the weight placed on race will be no more than 
necessary.  The four-fifths rule does not afford variation depending 
upon the asserted goal or the employer’s needs. 
                                                 
 174. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 336 (2003). 
 175. Id. at 336; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317–18. 
 176. See Ayres & Foster, supra note 23, at 523–24 (listing factors the Court has 
considered relevant to narrow tailoring). 
 177. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317–18 (distinguishing the Harvard admissions program 
from the medical school program in that the Harvard program allowed for “the 
weight attributed to a particular quality [to] vary from year to year depending upon 
the ‘mix’ both of the student body and the applicants for the incoming class”). 
 178. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336 (“[T]he number of underrepresented minority 
students who ultimately enroll in the Law School differs substantially from their 
representation in the applicant pool and varies considerably for each group from 
year to year.”).  Commentators have pointed out that in actuality the admissions 
program in Grutter  placed greater emphasis on race than the program in Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).  Ayres & Foster, supra note 23, at 538–39.  
Additionally, the use of race via the “critical mass” approach had a greater impact on 
admissions than the point system used in Gratz.  Id. at 535–36. 
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B. Individualized Decision Making 
Individualized decision making is another factor relevant to 
determining whether disparate impact meets the requirement of 
narrow tailoring.  Individualized decision making includes requiring 
preferences that are not quantified,179 are differentiated,180 and are 
not excessive.181  In Bakke, the Court was concerned by the medical 
school admissions program’s sole focus on ethnic diversity.182  The 
Court concluded that assigning a fixed number of seats to minorities 
was not necessary183 because it was not the only means to achieve 
diversity.184  In juxtaposition, the Bakke Court discussed with approval 
the admissions program administered at Harvard College.185   
Although race or ethnicity may have operated as a “plus” for an 
applicant, race was not a decisive factor in Harvard’s admissions 
program.186  Instead, the Harvard policy included other qualities in 
consideration of diversity and allowed the weight accorded to each 
factor to vary each year, depending upon the attributes of the current 
student body and candidates for the incoming class.187  Thus, the 
Harvard program employed race “in a flexible, nonmechanical way” 
that permitted individualized consideration of each applicant.188  The 
Bakke plurality “developed the individualized consideration 
requirement in order to police the distinction between an affirmative 
action program in which race was a legitimate (but not predominant) 
element of difference, and an affirmative action program that was 
sliding toward ‘the functional equivalent of a quota system.’”189 
In Grutter, the Court concluded that the law school’s program was 
narrowly tailored like the Harvard program because of its flexibility.190  
                                                 
 179. See Ayres & Foster, supra note 23, at 545 (clarifying that “no quantified 
preferences” means that the decision-making process does not have specified weights 
in a formula for admission). 
 180. See id. at 547 (citing Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271–73) (noting that the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Gratz implies that differentiation is required in a decision making 
process). 
 181. See id. (noting that the Supreme Court also attacked placing excessive 
emphasis on any single characteristic in the decision making process).   
 182. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315. 
 183. Id. at 316.  
 184. Id. at 314–15.  
 185. Id. at 321–24. 
 186. Id. at 317. 
 187. Id. at 317–18. 
 188. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003). 
 189. Robert C. Post, Foreword:  Fashioning the Legal Constitution:  Culture, Courts, and 
Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 68–69 (2003) (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318). 
 190. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334. 
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The law school’s program provided a “highly individualized, holistic 
review [for] each applicant’s file,” regardless of race.191  
In contrast to the Harvard program discussed in Bakke and the 
Grutter program, the lack of individualized decision making was one 
factor that led to the invalidation of the admissions program in the 
companion case Gratz v. Bollinger.192  In Gratz, an undergraduate 
university employed a multi-factored admissions system that included 
the following:  “the quality of an applicant’s high school (S), the 
strength of an applicant’s high school curriculum (C), an applicant’s 
unusual circumstances (U), an applicant’s geographical residence 
(G), and an applicant’s alumni relationship (A).”193  In addition  
to these factors, the university considered an applicant’s 
“underrepresented minority status, socioeconomic disadvantage, or 
attendance at a high school with a predominantly underrepresented 
minority population, or underrepresentation in the unit to which the 
student was applying.”194  The Court held that the University’s 
program was not narrowly tailored because the school automatically 
awarded twenty points to every underrepresented minority, which 
amounted to one-fifth of the necessary points for admission.195  
Although the admissions program in Gratz used race as a “plus” factor 
like the Harvard program and Grutter program, the automatic 
distribution of twenty points did not allow for individualized decision 
making.196  
Similarly, in Parents Involved, although the school district employed 
a multi-tiered system of tiebreakers, the Court nonetheless concluded 
that “under each plan when race comes into play, it [was] decisive by 
itself.”197  Consequently, the school assignment policy was not 
                                                 
 191. Id. at 337. 
 192. 539 U.S. 244, 273–74 (2003).  
 193. Id. at 254. 
 194. Id. at 255. 
 195. Id. at 270. 
 196. Id.  Justice Souter argued in his dissent that the college in Gratz applied a 
“holistic review” of its applicants like the law school in Grutter.  Id. at 295 (Souter, J., 
dissenting).  The only difference was that in using the numbered scale, the college 
did not “hide the ball.”  Id. at 298; see also Ayres & Foster, supra note 23, at 519  (“If 
the government decisionmaker does not ‘tell’ courts how much of a racial 
preference it is giving[,] . . . courts will essentially not ‘ask’ probing questions about 
whether the preferences are differentiated or excessive.”); Post, supra note 189, at 74 
(“[T]he value assigned to race is camouflaged by an opaque process of implicit 
comparisons [in Grutter].  Although transparency is ordinarily prized in the law, the 
Court in Grutter and Gratz constructs doctrine that in effect demands obscurity.”).  
Commentators have pointed out that the “[l]aw [s]chool may have been more 
formulaic than the [c]ollege,” but the Court “took the law school at its word its 
admissions program was nuanced.”  Ayres & Foster, supra note 23, at 549, 552.  
 197. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 723 
(2007) (plurality opinion). 
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narrowly tailored because it employed racial factors in a mechanical, 
rather than individualized manner.198  
As seen in the above cases, in order for the disparate impact 
provision to satisfy the narrowly tailored requirement, it must provide 
individualized consideration through case-by-case evaluation.  
Determining whether the provision meets this requirement can be 
evaluated by framing the issue in two ways.  First, does the disparate 
impact provision force employers to use racial classification in 
making employment decisions in a non-individualized fashion?  
When framed this way, it appears that the provision removes 
individualized decision making from employers because of the four-
fifths rule.  Even if an employer were to evaluate each candidate’s 
application individually, an employer would create a prima facie 
violation of the provision if a disparity of more than twenty percent 
occurs between the selection rate of the most successful group and 
other racial groups.  Even though other factors are later considered 
in assessing liability, race is the only factor in determining if there is a 
prima facie violation.  Like the impact of the automatic twenty point 
distribution in Gratz and the multi-tiered tiebreaker system in Parents 
Involved, the four-fifths rule makes race a decisive factor for 
identifying prima facie violations.  Thus, the decisive role that race 
plays in implicating a prima facie case of disparate impact supports 
Justice Scalia’s criticism that “the disparate-impact provisions sweep 
too broadly . . . since they fail to provide an affirmative defense for 
good-faith (i.e., nonracially motivated) conduct, or perhaps even for 
good-faith plus hiring standards that are entirely reasonable.”199   
Another way to frame the issue is whether the provision allows for 
individualized consideration by the courts in assessing disparate 
impact liability.  It is possible that the disparate impact provision 
satisfies the requirement for individualized decision making because 
the provision affords consideration of multiple factors in ultimately 
determining liability.  Before liability is finally assessed under the 
provision, a court reviews whether an employer’s business practice is 
a business necessity and job related.200  Additionally, a court considers 
whether an employer refused to use an equally effective alternative 
with less adverse effect.201   
When framed in this way, the disparate impact provision avoids the 
deficiency of Gratz.  In Gratz, individualized decision making could 
                                                 
 198. Id. at 723.  
 199. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 200. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006). 
 201. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (2006). 
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take place once a file was flagged, but the Court was unpersuaded by 
this possibility because individual review occurred in exceptional 
cases, not as a general rule.202  The disparate impact provision, 
however, provides individual consideration of other factors in every 
case of prima facie disparate impact to ultimately determine 
liability.203  In this regard, the provision comports with Grutter and 
Bakke’s conceptions of holistic, individual review because race is not 
the decisive factor in the final assessment of disparate impact 
liability.204  Thus, whether the disparate impact provision affords 
individualized consideration to meet strict scrutiny’s narrowly 
tailored requirement depends upon whether the provision is 
evaluated at the initial stage when a prima facie case of disparate 
impact arises or at the final stage of determining liability when 
defenses are considered.  
V. SCOPE OF THE PROGRAM:  OVERINCLUSIVE AND UNDERINCLUSIVE 
A. The Court’s Treatment of Underinclusive and Overinclusive Acts 
For the disparate impact provision’s use of racial classification to be 
narrowly tailored, such classifications must not be underinclusive or 
overinclusive.  An underinclusive classification results when 
legislation fails to encompass all similarly situated people in terms of 
the legislation’s objective; some people are included while others who 
are similarly situated for purposes of the law are excluded.205  
Overinclusiveness occurs when the legislation overreaches in its 
inclusion of all persons similarly situated for the purpose of the law 
and of persons whose inclusion is not relevant to the law’s objective.206 
Although the Court did not explicitly use the term 
“underinclusive” in its analysis in Parents Involved, two concepts of 
underinclusiveness can be construed from that case. First, 
underinclusive can mean failure to include the persons who should 
be included for the purpose of the law.207  The plurality in Parents 
Involved questioned the school districts’ purported interest in 
                                                 
 202. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 283–84 (2003). 
 203. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
 204. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003) (allowing race as a 
contributing factor); see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 
(1978) (holding that a program that incorporates a “plus” system for race but still 
compares all applicants satisfies equal protection). 
 205. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 746 (8th ed. 
2010). 
 206. Id.  
 207. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 723 
(2007) (plurality opinion). 
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achieving diversity when the districts focused solely on ethnic 
diversity, without considering the “far broader array of qualifications 
and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single 
though important element.”208  In this regard, the focus on racial or 
ethnic origin was underinclusive for the goal of achieving diversity.209  
Moreover, with respect to the consideration of racial diversity, the 
districts were underinclusive by considering race exclusively in terms 
of white and non-white or black and “other.”210   
A second concept of underinclusiveness entails the minimal impact 
or effectiveness of the legislation at achieving its goal.  In Parents 
Involved, the Court pointed out that the racial tiebreaker ultimately 
shifted a small number of students.211  The limited impact 
undermined the necessity of using racial classification to achieve the 
asserted goal of racial integration for socialization and education.212   
Overinclusiveness is another factor that is detrimental to a race-
conscious program.  In Croson, the “gross overinclusiveness” of the 
plan undermined the argument that the plan was narrowly tailored.213  
The Court criticized the plan for its “random inclusion” of racial 
groups that were not victims of discrimination214 by allowing any 
qualified Minority Business Enterprise to take advantage of the thirty 
percent set aside.215 
Similarly, in Bakke, the Court questioned the medical school’s 
inclusion of African Americans, Mexican Americans, American 
Indians, and Asians among the preferred groups for the sixteen seats 
set aside, noting that Asians were already admitted in great 
numbers.216  This remark implied that Asians did not need 
preferential treatment through the quota and that the Court deemed 
admissions policy to be overinclusive because of their inclusion.217 
                                                 
 208. Id. at 722 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003)) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 209. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 733 (“To the extent the objective is sufficient 
diversity[,] . . . using means that treat students solely as members of a racial group is 
fundamentally at cross-purposes with that end.”). 
 210. Id. at 703. 
 211. Id. at 733.  
 212. Id. at 734; see also Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Constitutional Future of Race-
Neutral Efforts to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and Secondary 
Schools, 50 B.C. L. REV. 277, 285 (2009) (suggesting that limited impact indicates 
existence of alternatives). 
 213. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 506, 508 (1989).  
 214. Id. at 506. 
 215. Id. at 478. 
 216. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 309 n.45 (1978).  
 217. Id. 
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The impact of underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness on 
satisfying the narrowly tailored requirement is even more 
pronounced beyond the context of racial classifications.  In Citizens 
United v. FEC,218 the Court invalidated a statute as violative of the First 
Amendment because the statute prohibited independent corporate 
expenditures advocating a candidate’s election or defeat.219  The 
purpose of the statute was to protect shareholders from being 
compelled to finance corporate political speech, but the statute was 
considered both underinclusive and overinclusive.220 As to 
underinclusiveness, the statute only prohibited speech in certain 
media and within a certain time frame, even though a shareholder’s 
interest would be affected regardless of the type of media or time.221  
Overinclusiveness resulted from the statute’s inclusion of all 
corporations, including nonprofit and single-shareholder for-profit 
corporations.222   
In Carey v. Brown,223 the Court invalidated a statute that prohibited 
picketing of residences or dwellings but allowed peaceful labor 
picketing.224  The state enacted the statute for the purposes of 
protecting the peace and privacy of residents from nonlabor 
picketing,225 but the Court concluded that the statute violated the 
Equal Protection Clause.226  The statute was both overinclusive and 
underinclusive because it permitted peaceful labor picketing without 
regard to the disturbances that would result while it broadly banned 
nonlabor picketing without distinguishing among the harms  
to residential privacy.227  Therefore, the cases demonstrate  
that overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness undermines the 
reasonableness of a program’s scope and its satisfaction of the 
narrowly tailored requirement.  
B. Overinclusive and Underinclusive Due to Probability for Error 
When the disparate impact provision is evaluated for 
overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness to determine narrow 
tailoring, one may find the provision’s scope to be problematic. The 
                                                 
 218. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 219. Id. at 911.  
 220. Id. 
 221. Id.  
 222. Id.  
 223. 447 U.S. 455 (1980). 
 224. Id. 457–58. 
 225. Id. at 458. 
 226. Id. 457–58. 
 227. Id. at 465. 
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disparate impact provision is not narrowly tailored because it may be 
overinclusive or underinclusive as a result of its probability for error.  
If the provision is overinclusive or underinclusive, its racial 
classifications are unnecessary and alternatives are likely available.   
A program may be overinclusive and/or underinclusive if it is not 
accurate.  Studies show that the probability of error with applying the 
four-fifths rule is high.228  Researchers have identified three problems 
arising from the four-fifths rule:  
(1) there is a high probability that an employer will be found to be 
discriminating under the four-fifths rule, when in fact, he is not 
discriminating; (2) there is a high probability that an employer will 
be held harmless due to compliance with the four-fifths rule when, 
in fact, he is discriminating against a group of employees; and (3) 
the four-fifths rule and statistical significance criterion indicate 
discrimination in quite different situations.229 
In one study, Professor Anthony Boardman determined the 
probability of making Type I errors (false positives) and Type II 
errors (false negatives).230  Professor Boardman calculated the 
outcomes in situations involving two groups and in situations with 
more than two groups.231  He found that the probability for error in 
claiming an adverse impact when none existed (Type I error) was 
greater than fifty percent when there were two groups with fewer 
than twenty-five people.232  For situations involving more than two 
groups, the probabilities for Type I errors were higher.233  The 
chances that people who were adversely impacted but failed to claim 
adverse impact (Type II errors) were higher than forty percent, 
regardless of whether there were two or three groups.234   
As Professor Boardman concluded, “the EEOC’s rule appears to 
invite considerable inappropriate litigation” while “fail[ing] to clearly 
                                                 
 228. Anthony E. Boardman, Another Analysis of the EEOC “Four-Fifths” Rule, 25 
MGMT. SCI. 770, 776 (1979).  
 229. Anthony E. Boardman & Aidan R. Vining, The Role of Probative Statistics in 
Employment Discrimination Cases, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189, 189 (1983).  But see 
Meier et al., supra note 63, at 169 (“The 80% rule appears to be a reasonable 
articulation of a statistical criterion to determine whether statistically significant 
differences are substantial enough to warrant legal liability.”). 
 230. Boardman, supra note 228, at 770 (using a model that assumed that the 
number of people promoted is predetermined). 
 231. Id.  
 232. Id. at 776.  Professor Boardman provides detailed explanation of his model 
and formulas, but there is no explanation for what may account for Type I and Type 
II errors, or why the percentages for these errors are so high.  
 233. Id.; see also Irwin Greenberg, An Analysis of the EEOC “Four-Fifths” Rule,  
25 MGMT. SCI. 762, 765 (1979) (“As the number of groups increases, the chance of 
making a type I error increases.”). 
 234. Boardman, supra note 228, at 776. 
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indicate discrimination when discrimination exists.”235  Although it is 
not clear whether a fifty percent likelihood of a Type I error by a 
prospective claimant will necessarily equate to a fifty percent 
likelihood of enforcement by the EEOC and private parties,236 an 
over-filing of adverse impact claims increases the chances that these 
mistaken claims will lead to erroneous over-enforcement of the 
disparate impact provision and erroneous assessment of liability.   
The implication of Type II errors is clearer.  Assuming that the 
bulk of disparate impact litigation result from claimants filing charges 
with the EEOC (as opposed to the EEOC initiating charges),237 if 
there is a forty percent likelihood that potential claimants are failing 
to file adverse impact charges, it is reasonable to conclude that this 
percentage strongly correlates to the percentage of under-
enforcement by the EEOC and private parties.  Thus, Professor 
Boardman’s study reveals the immense likelihood that the four-fifths 
rule will be overinclusive, casting its enforcement net so widely that it 
captures employers who are not in fact causing an adverse impact.238  
                                                 
 235. Id.; see also Richard M. Cohn, On the Use of Statistics in Employment 
Discrimination Cases, 55 INDUS. REL. L. J. 493, 493 n.3 (1979) (concluding that the four-
fifths rule “can lead either to the false charge of adverse impact or to the conclusion 
that no adverse impact exists when, in fact, the employer’s selection procedure is 
discriminatory”); Greenberg, supra note 233, at 766 (“[I]t is clear that the four-fifths 
rule is not well-suited to achieve equal employment opportunities.”). 
 236. An unlawful employment complaint begins with a written charged filed by a 
complainant under oath.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2006).  The Commission 
determines, after an investigation, whether it has a reasonable cause to believe the 
charges are true.  After such a determination, the Commission may pursue the 
charges by “informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.”  Id.   
If the Commission is unable to obtain voluntary compliance within a set time, the 
complainant or, under certain circumstances, another alleged to be aggrieved, or the 
EEOC may file a civil action.  Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).  Thus, although the Commission is 
responsible for reviewing every charge, the Commission may not pursue every charge 
beyond the investigation phase.  The right-to-sue letter imposes a condition 
precedent for private parties filing a Title VII claim in federal court.  Roy L. Brooks, 
Beyond Civil Rights Restoration Legislation:  Restructuring Title VII, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
551, 557 (1989).   
For example, in 2010, the Commission received 35,890 charges alleging race-based 
discrimination.  Of those charges filed, the Commission determined “no reasonable 
cause” existed for 26,319 charges (70.1%) and “reasonable cause” existed for 1,330 
charges (3.5%).  The statistics provided by the EEOC do not distinguish between 
disparate treatment charges and disparate impact charges.  See Race-Based Charges:   
FY 1997–FY 2010, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/race.cfm, (last visited February 
14, 2011) (compiling data on race-based discrimination).  
 237. A member of the EEOC may file a charge when the member believes an 
unlawful employment practice exists.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(b)(2006); see also BARBARA 
T. LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1626, 1659–62 
(C. Geoffrey Weirich et al., eds, 4th ed. 2007)(discussing a commissioner’s charge). 
 238. See Boardman, supra note 228, at 776 (concluding that this fraction system 
presents a double bind:  any change to avoid finding discrimination in innocent 
employers risks failing to uncover real discrimination). 
NGOV.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 2/24/2011  5:39 PM 
2011] WHEN THE “EVIL DAY” COMES 569 
His study also supports an inference that the four-fifths rule is 
underinclusive, failing to capture the employers who are in fact 
causing an adverse impact.239   
Numerous studies have yielded similar results.240  For example, 
Professors Marion Gross Sobol and Charles Ellard concluded that in 
some circumstances “the four-fifths rule signals discrimination when 
in fact there is none; the four-fifths rule seems to exaggerate true 
adverse impact.”241  They also found that in other situations, however, 
“[t]he four-fifths rule, instead of exaggerating discrimination with 
large . . . numbers, is not sensitive enough to the discriminatory 
situation.  Thus, under the four-fifths rule, Type II error is 
committed.”242 
Although a majority of the studies on the four-fifths rule were 
conducted on the heels of the EEOC’s promulgation of the rule in 
1978, recent studies also confirm the fallibility of the rule.  In one 
study, researchers conducted a statistical survey of the data in Ricci 
and concluded that a fair, non-discriminatory test for either the 
lieutenant or captain position would fail the four-fifths rule nearly 
seventy percent of the time.243  Additionally, fair tests for both 
positions would fail the four-fifths rule at least sixty percent of the 
time.244  Researchers using the 0.05 significance level245 found that 
                                                 
 239. See supra text accompanying notes 234–35. 
 240. See generally Louis J. Braun, Statistics and the Law:  Hypothesis Testing and Its 
Application to Title VII Cases, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 59, 80–81 (1980) (“This rule can easily 
lead to inaccurate results.”); Cohn, supra note 235 (arguing that reliance on 
quantitative data can mislead employment discrimination litigants); Greenberg, 
supra note 233 (showing that the four-fifths rule fails due to both types of errors); 
Meier et al., supra note 63 (comparing two statistical tests and finding the four-fifths 
rule more helpful for determining substantial discrimination); Sobol & Ellard, supra 
note 48 (finding that, depending on the particular values used, the four-fifths rule 
can lead to both types of errors); Van Bowen & Riggins, supra note 45 (testing the 
four-fifths methodology for uniformity across employers and finding it lacking). 
 241. Sobol & Ellard, supra note 48, at 395. 
 242. Id. at 396.  
 243. Joseph L. Gastwirth & Weiwen Miao, Formal Statistical Analysis of the Data in 
Disparate Impact Cases Provides Sounder Inferences Than the U.S. Government’s ‘Four-Fifths’ 
Rule:  An Examination of the Statistical Evidence in Ricci v. DeStefano, 8 L., PROBABILITY 
& RISK 171, 171 (2009).  
 244. Id. 
 245. Levels of significance are evidentiary mechanisms of disproving a hypothesis.  
R.A. Fisher, responsible for developing the concept of “level of significance,” 
regarded  
any test of significance that results in a larger than 5% significance level (i.e., 
less than 1.96 standard errors) as unpersuasive, a difference with significance 
level between 5% and 2% (i.e., between 1.96 and 2.33 standard errors) as 
credible, and a difference with significance level more extreme than 2% 
(i.e., greater than 2.33 standard errors) as clearly indicative of a real, 
underlying difference. 
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despite the lower courts’ conclusions that both the lieutenant and 
captain examinations in Ricci had a disparate impact, only one of the 
tests had differences in pass rates that were statistically significant.246  
The research concluded that differences in pass rates on the 
lieutenant examination were statistically significant, whereas the pass 
rate differences on the captain examination “were not close to 
statistical significance.”247 
What accounts for the high probability of Type I and II errors in 
these studies has not been explained, but perhaps the probability of 
errors is related to the four-fifths rule as a threshold for proving 
disparate impact.  The four-fifths rule may be overinclusive and 
underinclusive depending on the size of the employer.248  For 
example, “a small employer with a small absolute disparity between 
male and female applicants might face liability under the rule, while 
a large employer can have a much greater disparity and still comply 
with the four-fifths rule.”249  
Sample size (the size of the employer, i.e., the number of 
employees in a business) also affects statistical significance tests.250  
“[T]he smaller the sample size, the larger the disparity in rates can be 
without reaching statistical significance.”251  When the sample size is 
                                                 
Meier et al., supra note 63 63, at 151.  An event found to be significant at the 2% level 
means a smaller probability that the event resulted from randomness as compared 
with a 5% level of significance.  Id.   
Researchers generally use a five percent (0.05) level of significance, which is also 
known as the ninety-five percent confidence level.  See Peresie, supra note 161, at 785; 
Elaine W. Shoben, Comment, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing:  
Statistical Proof under Title VII, 91 HARV. L. REV. 793, 800 (1978) (“Statisticians often 
adopt a 5% rule of thumb, rejecting the null hypothesis if the probability of 
obtaining the sample pass rate difference by chance is less than 5%.”); Van Bowen & 
Riggins, supra note 45, at 651 (“Statisticians use the five percent figure most often 
and refer to it as the ninety-five percent level of significance.”). But see Meier et al., 
supra note 63, at 151 n.46 (citing William H. Kruskal, Significance, Tests of, in  
2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STATISTICS 944 (William H. Kruskal & Judith A. 
Tanur, eds., 1978) (“[T]here is no professional consensus about the proper use of 
significance levels, or about which level of significance is critical, to claim the law’s 
particular attention.”).  The five percent level of significance has also “been accepted 
in many legal decisions.”  Gatswirth & Miao, supra note 243, at 176; Scott W. 
McKinley, Comment, The Need for Legislative or Judicial Clarity on the Four-Fifths Rule and 
How Employers in the Sixth Circuit Can Survive the Ambiguity, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 171,  
197–98 (2008) (discussing the .05 and .01 confidence levels as “cited with approval 
by courts as a proper method of measuring statistical significance” (citations 
omitted) (internal quotations omitted)).  
 246. Gastwirth & Miao, supra note 243, at 173.  
 247. Id. 
 248. Peresie, supra note 161, at 784. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Meier et al., supra note 63, at 155.    
 251. Id. (emphasis omitted); see also Boardman & Vining, supra note 229, at 206 
(“When samples are very small, large differentials are necessary to obtain statistically 
significant results.”).  
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small, there is a greater likelihood of false negatives, indicating the 
absence of discrimination, when, in fact, it exists.252  On the other 
hand, the larger the sample size, the more it will amplify any 
difference.253  Therefore, “whereas the four-fifths rule could be said to 
itself have a disparate impact on small employers, the statistical 
significance rule could be said to have a disparate impact on large 
employers because even a small disparity may achieve statistical 
significance.”254  
As a result of the effect of sample size, the disparate impact 
provision allows courts to choose sides merely by the measure of 
disparity selected.255  A small employer has a greater risk of liability 
under the four-fifths rule than under a statistical significance test, 
while a large employer faces the opposite risk.  On the other hand, a 
small sample size causes defendants to favor statistical significance 
                                                 
 252. Boardman & Vining, supra note 229, at 206. 
 253. Meier et al., supra note 63, at 160 (“[L]arge sample sizes will tend to make 
any difference statistically significant.”).  Researchers caution that one possible 
consequence of the effect of sample size on statistical significance tests is the 
pressure to resort to quotas.  Id. at 161.  Professors Meier, Sacks, and Zabell explain 
that businesses employing large numbers inevitably will be liable for disparate impact 
against a group.  Id.  Such businesses will be faced with the choice of expending 
thousands to validate their selection criteria or avoid the costs of validation by opting 
to use quotas, rather than the selection criteria.  Id. (citing Barbara Lerner, 
Washington v. Davis:  Quantity, Quality and Equality in Employment Testing, 1976  
SUP. CT. REV. 263).  For additional discussion about the expense of time and money 
necessary for validation tests, see supra note 152. 
The Court has been sensitive to the potential for disparate impact to lead 
employers to adopt quotas:  “We agree that the inevitable focus on statistics in 
disparate impact cases could put undue pressure on employers to adopt prophylactic 
measures.”  Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 992 (1988) (plurality 
opinion).  The Watson Court opined, “If quotas and preferential treatment become 
the only cost-effective means of avoiding expensive litigation and potentially 
catastrophic liability, such measures will be widely adopted.”  Id. at 993.  Ricci 
reiterated a similar concern:  The “focus on statistics could put undue pressure on 
employers to adopt inappropriate prophylactic measures.”  Ricci v. DeStefano, 129  
S. Ct. 2658, 2675 (2009) (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 992) (internal quotations 
omitted).  But see Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-Word as Red Herring:  Why 
Disparate Impact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1487, 1489 
(1996) (arguing that the disparate impact provision does not induce quotas).  
 254. Peresie, supra note 161, at 787; see also Boardman & Vining, supra note 229, at 
216 (“When few individuals are selected the probability that the protected group 
might claim adverse impact is much higher under the four-fifths rule than under the 
statistical significance rules.  When 200 people are selected, the rules are identical, 
while for larger selections the statistical significance rules are more stringent for the 
employer than is the four-fifths rule.”); Sobol & Ellard, supra note 48, at 393 n.40 
(1988) (“For very small sample sizes both the 4/5ths rule and a binomial test, based 
upon approximation to the normal distribution, are inadequate measures of 
discrimination.  In the case of the 4/5ths rule, the effect of hiring or failing to hire 
just one person has a grossly disproportionate effect on the determination of 
discrimination.”); Shoben, supra note 245, at 809 (describing the importance of 
sample size in determining whether a discrepancy in pass rates is significant).   
 255. Peresie, supra note 161, at 789. 
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and plaintiffs to favor the four-fifths rule—but as the sample size 
increases, that preference switches.256  Applying these results, if a 
court is pro-defendant, “it will prefer the four-fifths rule where the 
selection rates at issue are high (because a significant disparity will 
not be actionable), but not where the selection rates are low.”257  
Thus, whether disparate impact is measured by statistical significance 
tests or the four-fifths rule, the disparate impact provision is prone to 
be overinclusive and underinclusive. 
Another related problem with the four-fifths rule is that it does not 
assist courts in assessing causation. 258  Instead, the rule creates a “high 
threshold (the four-fifths ratio) necessary to establish a disparate 
impact in order to provide for the possibility that other factors are 
causing the disparity.  But this at most indirectly evaluates causation 
and results in a significant false negatives problem.”259  This criticism 
affects the efficacy of the disparate impact provision in achieving its 
purpose.  As seen in Parents Involved, the limited impact the provision 
has on attaining its asserted goal undermines its ability to satisfy the 
narrow tailoring requirement.260  
If the disparate impact provision, however, takes into consideration 
sample size and statistical significance, it might avoid the criticism of 
being underinclusive or overinclusive and not causally relevant.  As 
some researchers suggest, “[t]he 80% rule appears to be a reasonable 
articulation of a statistical criterion to determine whether statistically 
significant differences are substantial enough to warrant legal 
liability.”261  The four-fifths rule appears to allow for the effect of 
sample size by “incorporating a measure of practical significance.”262  
                                                 
 256. Id.; see also Sobol & Ellard, supra note 48, at 398 (“The error of the four-fifths 
rule also increases as the size of the hiring population increases.  For small numbers 
of hires the four-fifths criterion is actually more demanding on the employer than 
the binomial test.  For large numbers of hires the binomial test is more demanding 
on the employer.  Thus, in comparison to the binomial test, the four-fifths rule will 
be more likely to find discrimination where it does not exist (Type I error) for a small 
firm, and less likely to find discrimination where it does exist (Type II error) for a 
large firm.”); Van Bowen & Riggins, supra note 45, at 650 (“[T]he four-fifths or 
eighty per cent rule is not statistically valid and should not be used because it does 
not apply consistently to all employers. . . . The eighty percent rule produces 
different results depending on variables in the percentage of minorities in the 
relevant labor pool and in the number of selections made.”).  
 257. Peresie, supra note 161, at 789. 
 258. Id. at 791. 
 259. Id. at 791. 
 260. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 734 
(2007) (plurality opinion) (explaining the failed policy of using racial classifications 
to determine school assignments for minority students). 
 261. Meier et al., supra note 63, at 169. 
 262. Id. at 168.  The four-fifths rule provides as follows:  
NGOV.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 2/24/2011  5:39 PM 
2011] WHEN THE “EVIL DAY” COMES 573 
If researchers Boardman, Vining, Sobol, Ellard, and others took the 
four-fifths rule’s allowance for sample size into account and if their 
results are unaffected, then their conclusions concerning the 
disparate impact provision’s potential for false positive and false 
negative errors might still show that the provision is vulnerable to 
underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness.  If, however, the four-fifths 
rule’s allowance for sample size was not considered, it might affect 
the results of the researchers’ conclusions about false positive and 
false negative errors, and consequently the determination of the 
reasonableness of the disparate impact provision’s scope.  Thus, 
whether the provision is narrowly tailored in this regard is unsettled. 
C. Exclusion of White Males Would Lead to Underinclusiveness 
The purpose of the disparate impact provision may be frustrated if 
it excludes individuals of a certain racial group from alleging 
discrimination based on race, despite their historical safety from 
discrimination.  For example, the disparate impact provision may be 
underinclusive if it excludes white males from making disparate 
impact claims.263  No definitive answer to the question of whether the 
provision allows for claims by white males can be found among the 
Supreme Court cases involving disparate impact because there have 
                                                 
Smaller differences in selection rate may nevertheless constitute adverse 
impact, where they are significant in both statistical and practical terms or 
where a user’s actions have discouraged applicants disproportionately on 
grounds of race, sex, or ethnic group.  Greater differences in selection rate 
may not constitute adverse impact where the differences are based on small 
numbers and are not statistically significant, or where special recruiting or 
other programs cause the pool of minority or female candidates to be 
atypical of the normal pool of applicants from that group.  Where the user’s 
evidence concerning the impact of a selection procedure indicates adverse 
impact but is based upon numbers which are too small to be reliable, 
evidence concerning the impact of the procedure over a longer period of 
time and/or evidence concerning the impact which the selection procedure 
had when used in the same manner in similar circumstances elsewhere may 
be considered in determining adverse impact.  
EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2010). 
 263. Interestingly, veterans’ preference is one of the few, if not the only, neutral 
selection device that affords African Americans an advantage over whites.   
See Chamallas, supra note 88, at 368 n.310 (citing Smith v. City of E. Cleveland, 363  
F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ohio 1973), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom., Smith v. Troyan, 
520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975)).  In Smith, only thirty-six percent of the white 
applicants were veterans and entitled to a veterans’ preference compared with the 
seventy-five percent of African American applicants who were veterans and also given 
the preference.  363 F. Supp. at 1146.  The plaintiffs, however, consisted of African 
Americans and females.  Id. at 1133. 
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not been any white male plaintiffs.264  Additionally, there is no 
consensus among commentators.265   
The arguments against applying the disparate impact provision in 
favor of white males center on the legislative intent of the Civil Rights 
Acts of 1964 and 1991.266  Griggs and Sheet Metal Workers suggest that 
                                                 
 264. Primus, supra note 22, at 527; Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside 
Down?:  Disparate Impact Claims By White Males, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1505, 1524 (2004).   
Although Ricci is a Supreme Court case that involved disparate impact, Ricci does 
not provide an answer as to whether the provision protects white males because the 
white male plaintiffs challenged the city’s action under the disparate treatment 
provision and the Equal Protection Clause.  Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 
(2009).  The disparate impact issue in Ricci related to whether the city had “a strong 
basis in evidence” to believe that African American firefighters had a disparate 
impact claim. Id. at 2681.  
While the Supreme Court has yet to address a case involving white males filing 
disparate impact claims, several lower courts have confronted this issue.  See, e.g., 
Barnhill v. Chicago Police Department, 142 F. Supp. 2d 948, 963 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (suit by 
white-male plaintiffs against police department alleging that an examination had a 
discriminatory impact on Caucasians in contravention of Title VII);  Foss v. Thompson, 
242 F.3d 1131, 1134 (9th Cir. 2001)(allegation by white male that the employer’s 
requirement that applicants have a nursing degree caused a disparate impact on the 
basis of sex);  Zottola v. City of Oakland, 32 F. App’x 307, 309 (9th Cir. 
2002)(involving a claim that the city’s use of oral interviews as part of an examination 
for hiring firefighters had a disparate impact on white males); Sims v. Montgomery 
County Sheriff’s Department, 887 F. Supp. 1479, 1485–86 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (claim by 
white male deputy intervenors that inadequate notice of a deadline caused a 
disparate impact on white males but the court found the claim lacked merit); Johnson 
v. Holley, Nos. 3:07-0979, 3:08-0031, 2008 WL 3163531, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 4, 
2008)(court recognizing plaintiffs’ argument that a police department promotional 
examination had a disparate impact on white males). 
These cases do not directly hold that white males are covered by the disparate 
impact provision.  By allowing claims by white males to proceed and addressing the 
merits of their disparate impact claim, however, the courts recognized implicitly that 
white males fall within the protection of the provision.  In all of these cases, none of 
the defendants argued that the disparate impact provision was unavailable to white 
males, nor did the courts hesitate to conduct its analysis on the merits of the 
disparate impact claim for want of proper plaintiffs.  The courts did not dismiss the 
cases because the plaintiffs were white males and ineligible to assert disparate impact 
claim by virtue of race and sex, but rather the courts disposed of these cases for lack 
of evidence showing a prima facie case of disparate impact.  These cases are evidence 
that white males may proceed under the disparate impact theory if sufficient 
evidence exists. 
 265. Primus, supra note 22, at 527; Sullivan, supra note 264, at 1524.  For 
arguments that disparate impact claims are unavailable to white males, see 
Chamallas, supra note 88, at 366–68; Kate L. Didech, Note, The Extension of Disparate 
Impact Theory to White Men:  What the Civil Rights Act of 1991 Plainly Does not Mean,  
10 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 55, 74–75 (2004) For arguments favoring inclusion of white 
males, see Pamela L. Perry, Two Faces of Disparate Impact Discrimination, 59 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 523, 558 (1991); Sullivan, supra note 264, at 1512; Michael L. Zimmer, 
Individual Disparate Impact Law:  On the Plain Meaning of the 1991 Civil Rights Act,  
30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 473, 501–02 (1999).  
 266. See Chamallas, supra note 88, at 367 (arguing that Congress “was concerned 
with improving the economic status of blacks”); Didech, supra note 265, at 74 
(arguing that extending disparate impact theory to white men is “not within the 
statute’s spirit and the intention of its makers”); John J. Donahue III, Comment, 
Understanding the Reasons for and Impact of Legislatively Mandated Benefits for Selected 
Workers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 897, 898 (2001).   
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the original intent of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to protect 
minorities only:  “Title VII was designed ‘to achieve equality of 
employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in 
the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other 
employees.’”267   
Additionally, United Steelworks v. Weber268 can be interpreted as 
supporting a limitation against extending the disparate impact 
provision to protect white males.269  In Weber, the Court concluded 
that “Congress’ primary concern in enacting the prohibition against 
racial discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was 
with ‘the plight of the Negro in our economy.’”270  The Weber Court 
decided that “it was clear to Congress that ‘[t]he crux of the problem 
[was] to open employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations 
which have been traditionally closed to them,’ and it was to this 
problem that Title VII’s prohibition against racial discrimination in 
employment was primarily addressed.”271   
Finally, the legislative intent of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 could 
support a similar interpretation.  Because the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
adopted the definitions of business necessity and job relatedness 
from Griggs,272 it codified the theory of disparate impact along with 
the Court’s interpreted limitations.273   
There are, however, problems with the theory that white males 
cannot avail themselves of the disparate impact provision.  While the 
language of Griggs suggests a limitation against white males, McDonald 
v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.,274 Bakke, and Teal support allowing 
disparate impact claims by white males.  McDonald involved a claim of 
discrimination by a white male who was discharged by his employer 
and addressed whether Title VII covered intentional discrimination 
against white employees.275  Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous 
court, declared:  
                                                 
 267. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Assoc. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 448 
(1986) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–03 (1971)). 
 268. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
 269. Id. at 199, 209 (permitting under Title VII an affirmative action plan 
bargained by the union and employer that reserved fifty percent of the openings in a 
training program for African American employees).  
 270. Id. at 202 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. S6548 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1964) 
(statement of Rep. Humphrey)).  
 271. Id. at 203 (alterations original) (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 6548 (1964) 
(statement of Rep. Humphrey)). 
 272. See 137 Cong. Rec. 30630, 30662 (1991) (stating that codifying Griggs was one 
of the purposes of § 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991). 
 273. Sullivan, supra note 264, at 1534. 
 274. 427 U.S. 273 (1976). 
 275. Id. at 278–80. 
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits the discharge of 
“any individual” because of “such individual’s race.”  Its terms are 
not limited to discrimination against members of any particular 
race. . . . This conclusion is in accord with uncontradicted 
legislative history to the effect that Title VII was intended to “cover 
white men and white women and all Americans” and create an 
“obligation not to discriminate against whites.”  We therefore hold 
today that Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against the white 
petitioners in this case upon the same standards as would be 
applicable were they Negroes and Jackson white.276 
Although McDonald did not raise a disparate impact claim, the 
Court’s holding suggests that Title VII is universally available. 
Bakke also buttresses an inclusive interpretation of the disparate 
impact provision to encompass white males.  In Bakke, the medical 
school argued that the Court should not apply strict scrutiny because 
the plaintiff, a white male, is not among a “discrete and insular 
minority” group that is afforded heightened protection.277  The Court 
unequivocally declared that “[r]acial and ethnic classifications, 
however, are subject to stringent examination without regard to these 
additional characteristics.”278  The Court explained, “[a]lthough many 
of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment conceived of its 
primary function as bridging the vast distance between members of 
the Negro race and the white ‘majority,’ the Amendment itself was 
framed in universal terms, without reference to color, ethnic origin, 
or condition of prior servitude.”279   
Similarly, although Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and 1991 with the vision of bringing equality to African Americans,280 
the disparate impact provision, too, was framed in universal terms.  As 
Bakke demonstrated, the universal language of an act prevails over 
Congressional intent.281  Therefore, because the disparate impact 
provision was written in universal terms, the provision also affords 
white males protection. 
Additionally, Teal’s individual-centered approach also supports an 
expansive interpretation of the disparate impact provision.  In Teal, 
the plaintiffs filed a disparate impact claim because an employment 
                                                 
 276. Id. at 278–80 (internal citations omitted). 
 277. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978).  
 278. Id. (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 
(1938)). 
 279. Id. at 293 (internal citation omitted). 
 280. See Ngov, supra note 19, at 84–87.  
 281. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 337–38 (explaining that the broad language of the 
statute reflects the legislature’s intent for judicial determination of the statute’s 
applicability). 
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test that was required for promotion had an adverse effect on African 
Americans.282  The employer asserted a “bottom-line” theory of 
defense, arguing that the employer should not be liable for disparate 
impact caused by the test if the bottom-line outcome of the 
promotional process achieved racial balance.283   
Teal rejected the bottom-line defense because Title VII’s principle 
of equality centered on the individual, not groups.284  The Court 
concluded, “Title VII strives to achieve equality of opportunity by 
rooting out ‘artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary’ employer-created 
barriers to professional development that have a discriminatory 
impact upon individuals.”285  If, as interpreted by Teal, the disparate 
impact provision’s purpose is to protect individuals, not groups, then 
the provision should not exclude an entire class of individuals—white 
males.286   
Arguably, Teal’s individual-centered approach can be construed to 
restrict white males from asserting a disparate impact claim.  It is 
possible that while Teal interpreted Title VII as securing protection 
for individuals,287 it intended to address only minorities.  In Teal, the 
Court stated, “[t]he suggestion that disparate impact should be 
measured only at the bottom line ignores the fact that Title VII 
guarantees these individual respondents the opportunity to compete 
equally with white workers on the basis of job-related criteria.”288  
Teal’s reference to “white workers” may have the same limiting effect 
as Griggs’s reference to “white employees”289 as previously discussed.290   
But this argument may be less persuasive in light of the context of 
Teal and Griggs.  It is important to recognize that Teal and the other 
Supreme Court cases containing language that suggests the 
unavailability of disparate impact claims for white males all involved 
minority and female plaintiffs.291  Also, although Weber and Sheet Metal 
                                                 
 282. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 443–44 (1982). 
 283. Id. at 442. 
 284. See id. at 451 (describing Title VII’s purpose of eliminating employment 
barriers that bar individuals from advancing). 
 285. Id. (emphasis added). 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971). 
 290. See supra text accompanying note 267. 
 291. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231–32 (1989) (female 
candidate refused partnership position in firm); Teal, 457 U.S. at 442–43 (black 
employees allege discrimination on promotion examination); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 
426–27 (black employees sue for discriminatory employment practices). 
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Workers involved white plaintiffs, they did not directly assert a 
disparate impact claim.292  
Ultimately, even if the legislative intent of the Civil Rights Acts of 
1964 and 1991 did not extend protection to white males, precluding 
white males from asserting a disparate impact claim would raise an 
obvious equal protection challenge.  Such a restrictive interpretation 
of the disparate impact provision would be contrary to our current 
notions of what is emblematic of the Equal Protection Clause.293  The 
exclusion of white males from the protection of the provision would, 
in and of itself, involve a classification resulting in unequal 
application of the provision, which would trigger strict scrutiny and 
require a compelling interest to justify this exclusion.   
Additionally, regardless of the asserted compelling interest, for 
example, smoking out discrimination, providing role models, 
attaining the benefits of diversity, meeting operational needs, or 
removing barriers to equal employment opportunities,294 excluding 
white males from asserting a disparate impact claim would render the 
provision underinclusive in meeting any one of these interests.  For 
example, if the disparate impact provision’s racial classification was 
intended to attain the benefits of diversity, excluding white males 
from the provision’s coverage would hamper the furtherance of 
fostering cross-racial understanding and problem solving.295  Consider 
another example.  If the compelling interest underlying the 
provision’s racial classification rested on removing barriers to equal 
employment opportunities, that goal would be more effectively 
achieved if it allowed white males to sue for disparate impact.  
In light of the potential Equal Protection Clause violation that a 
restrictive interpretation of the disparate impact provision would 
raise, the rules of statutory construction would necessitate that white 
males be included.  The Court has operated under the principle that 
it will construe a statute in a manner that avoids declaring an act 
                                                 
 292. See Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 478 U.S. 421, 426 (1986) 
(determining whether a court can compel relief from discrimination that may 
benefit individuals who have not been subjected to historical discrimination); United 
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200–01 (1979) (determining the validity of a 
negotiated affirmative action plan in the hiring policy). 
 293. See Primus, supra note 22, at 496 (explaining the modern notion of equal 
protection as hostile towards government action that seeks to redress historical 
discrimination). 
 294. See Ngov, supra note 19, at 19 (discussing possible compelling interests that 
may justify the disparate impact provision’s racial classification under an Equal 
Protection Clause challenge).  
 295. See id. at 49–52 (discussing asserted benefits of diversity). 
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invalid if it is fairly possible to do so.296  Reliance on the plain 
language of the statute provides an expansive interpretation of the 
provision and would allow the Court to fairly avoid invalidating the 
provision for failing to include white males.   
VI. DURATION 
For the disparate impact provision to pass strict scrutiny, it must 
also be narrowly tailored in duration.297  Duration is a critical factor in 
evaluating whether a program is narrowly tailored because the Court 
has established that “all governmental use of race must have a logical 
end point.”298  As the Court has explained, “[t]his requirement 
reflects that racial classifications, however compelling their goals, are 
potentially so dangerous that they may be employed no more broadly 
than the interest demands.  Enshrining a permanent justification for 
racial preferences would offend this fundamental equal protection 
principle.”299 
A durational requirement has been applied in remedial programs 
in order to ensure that a program intended to remedy past 
discrimination is not being used simply to achieve and maintain 
racial balance.300  In Croson, the Court required findings not only to 
                                                 
 296. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring) (“When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and 
even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this 
Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by 
which the question may be avoided.”). 
 297. A normative discussion of whether affirmative action programs should have 
durational limits is beyond the scope of this article. 
 298. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003).  For example, the Court was 
reluctant to permit affirmative action programs that had “no logical stopping point” 
in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education.  476 U.S. 267, 275 (1986) (plurality opinion). 
 299. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342.  In his concurring opinion in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 
Justice Powell wrote that the “temporary nature of this remedy ensures that a race-
conscious program will not last longer than the discriminatory effects it is designed 
to eliminate.”  448 U.S. 448, 513 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).  
 300. See Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 
475 (1986) (explaining that though a court has discretion to fashion appropriate 
remedies for Title VII violations, a court “should exercise its discretion with an eye 
towards Congress’ concern that race-conscious affirmative measures not be invoked 
simply to create a racially balanced work force”).  Some courts have dissolved 
remedial plans that have lasted for thirty years.  See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate 
Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 764 (2006) (describing the Boston 
police and fire department’s use of remedial hiring plans and their dissolution by the 
district court after their existence for more than thirty years).  These plans were 
instituted pursuant to consent decrees, which were relied on even after the remedial 
goals specified in the decrees had been accomplished.  Id.  Other courts, however, 
have allowed remedial plans to continue after having lasted well over thirty years.  In 
Cotter v. City of Boston, the court found that discrimination existed as early as 1972.  
323 F.3d 160, 169 (2003).  When the city’s remedial plan was challenged, the court 
was persuaded that “remedying past discrimination takes time” and decided that 
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support a remedial need but also “to assure all citizens that the 
deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all racial and ethnic 
groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the service of the 
goal of equality itself.”301 Therefore, although the Court ultimately 
held that the city lacked a remedial purpose, it envisioned remedial 
programs as temporary devices.302 
Additionally, Paradise and Sheet Metal Workers support requiring a 
durational limit for race-conscious programs, as evidenced by the 
Court’s conclusions that the challenged programs were narrowly 
tailored because they were temporary.303  The Court described the 
membership goal in Sheet Metal Workers as a “temporary measure[]” 
that would end when the percentage of minorities in the local work 
force was reflected in the percentage of minorities in the union.304  
The Court concluded that the membership goal “operate[d] as a 
temporary tool for remedying past discrimination without attempting 
to maintain a previously achieved balance.”305   
Likewise, the Court determined that the quota in Paradise was 
“ephemeral” because “the term of its application [was] contingent 
upon the Department’s own conduct,”306 and explained that the fifty 
percent quota was “not itself the goal; rather it represent[ed] the 
speed at which the goal of 25% [would] be achieved.”307  The Court 
analogized the goal in Paradise to the end date imposed in Sheet Metal 
Workers:  “In these circumstances, the use of a temporary requirement 
of 50% minority promotions, which, like the end date in Sheet Metal 
Workers, was crafted and applied flexibly, was constitutionally 
permissible.”308  
In circumstances where the compelling interest is something other 
than remedial, the Court has been equally insistent on time limits.  
Grutter is one example.  Because the race-conscious program in 
Grutter was upheld on a compelling interest of achieving diversity and 
attaining its benefits, rather than on remedial grounds, one would 
                                                 
“[w]hile the numbers are more representative today, [the court was] not prepared to 
rule that all effects of past discrimination have been eliminated.”  Id. 
 301. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989) (plurality 
opinion).  
 302. Id. 
 303. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 178 (1987) (plurality opinion); Sheet 
Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 479.   
 304. Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 479 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Weber, 
443 U.S. 193, 216 (1979) (internal quotations omitted)). 
 305. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 306. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 178.  
 307. Id. at 179.   
 308. Id. at 180. 
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not expect a durational limit on diversity.309  On the other hand, one 
might expect a time limit for remedial programs because once the 
discrimination has been remedied, assuming that it can be reliably 
and readily ascertained, the program may no longer be necessary.  
Remedial programs seek to redress a “particular quantum of harm” 
with “clearer, more finite endpoints.”310   
Setting a durational limit on diversity, however, may be 
incongruous because it would amount to setting an “expiration date” 
on diversity.311  Diversity is not temporal by nature.312  As Professor 
Robert Post explains, “[i]f diversity is necessary in order to train 
competent professionals, for example, it is necessary at any and all 
times; there is no intrinsic time horizon when this need for diversity 
will disappear.”313   
Nonetheless, the Grutter Court refused to exempt the admissions 
program from durational limits,314 which the Court contemplated 
could be satisfied by sunset provisions and periodic reviews of the 
program to assess its necessity.315  Consequently, Justice O’Connor 
anticipated the following:  
It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use of 
race to further an interest in student body diversity in the context 
of higher education. . . . We expect that 25 years from now, the use 
                                                 
 309. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 338, 343 (2003) (extolling the virtues 
of a “broad range of qualities” outside of solely race as “valuable contributions” to the 
compelling interest of “student body diversity”).  
 310. See Bryan W. Leach, Note, Race as Mission Critical:  The Occupational Need 
Rationale in Military Affirmative Action and Beyond, 113 YALE L.J. 1093, 1101 (2004) 
(reporting that the durational limit inherent in remedial programs is attractive to a 
judiciary that does not want to “endorse open-ended schemes”). 
 311. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Last Twenty Five Years of Affirmative Action?,  
21 CONST. COMMENT. 171, 173 (2004) (arguing that the Court’s twenty-five-year 
sunset provision on affirmative action programs does not make sense when applied 
to student diversity as the compelling interest because “universities could still want to 
strive for a racially diverse student body even if an institution’s past discriminatory 
history has been fully addressed”).   
 312. See Johnson, supra note 311, at 183 (“[T]ime limits are normally associated 
with affirmative action programs designed to remedy past discrimination, not those 
aimed at ensuring a diverse student body.”); Post, supra note 189, at 67–68 n.306 
(“[T]he justification of diversity, unlike remedy, has no built-in time horizon; if 
diversity is necessary for the quality of education, it is necessary at any and all 
times.”); Christopher J. Schmidt, Caught in a Paradox:  Problems with Grutter’s 
Expectation that Race-Conscious Admissions Programs Will End in Twenty-Five Years,  
24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 753, 761 (2004) (describing the Court’s holding in Grutter 
“abrupt” and “puzzling” because a “time limitation requirement contradicts its 
conclusion that diversity is a compelling state interest since diversity is a non-time 
sensitive interest”).   
 313. Post, supra note 189, at 67 n.306. 
 314. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342 (“We see no reason to exempt race-conscious 
admissions programs from the requirement that all governmental use of race must 
have a logical end point.”). 
 315. Id. 
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of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the 
[diversity] interest . . . .316 
In light of the above cases, regardless of the type of compelling 
interest that might justify the disparate impact provision’s racial 
classifications, the provision must have a durational limit.  Arguably, 
the provision’s four-fifths rule can be construed as an end date like 
the twenty-five percent goal in Paradise and twenty-nine percent goal 
in Sheet Metal Workers.317  Under this argument, the four-fifths rule sets 
the pace at which the goal will be met.   
One notable difference, however, is that enforcement of the goals 
in Paradise and Sheet Metal Workers ceased once the remedial goals 
were achieved, thereby ensuring the goals’ temporary status.318  In 
contrast, even if the disparate impact provision serves a remedial 
need like that found in Paradise or Sheet Metal Workers, the four-fifths 
rule will not be lifted for the employer who has met the four-fifths or 
eighty percent proportion.319  The four-fifths rule continues to be 
enforced for every aspect of a business’s operation and, therefore, is 
not likely temporary.320 In effect, the four-fifths rule seeks to maintain 
a balanced work force, contrary to the Court’s prohibition, not 
merely to attain one.321  
If the four-fifths rule is not itself a time limit, then a limit must be 
set for the disparate impact provision.  Because Justice O’Connor 
contemplated a durational limit for diversity, a similar limit could be 
                                                 
 316. Id. at 343; see also Johnson, supra note 311, at 182–85 (discussing the 
justifications for time limits, institutional competence to establish time limits, and 
whether time limits are realistic).   
 317. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 180–81 (1987) (concluding that a 
goal of twenty-five percent representation is an appropriate goal to remedy past 
discrimination); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 
421, 440–41 (1986) (plurality opinion) (refusing to question the lower court’s order 
for twenty-nine percent minority representation).    
 318. See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 176 (acknowledging that judicial oversight would end 
once the Alabama Department for Public Safety had satisfied the district court’s 
order); Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 479 (stating that the district court’s order was 
temporary and would end as soon as the “percentage of minority union members 
approximate[d] the percentage of minorities in the local labor force”).   
 319. See supra Part I.C.  
 320.  See supra Part I.C. 
 321. In Sheet Metal Workers, the Court disapproved of government programs 
designed to maintain racial balances.  478 U.S. 421, 476 (1986).  In Johnson v. 
Transportation Agency, the Supreme Court emphasized that the approved plan “was 
intended to attain a balanced work force, not to maintain one.”  480 U.S. 616, 639 
(1987).  Although Johnson involved an issue of gender rather than racial 
discrimination and was reviewed under Title VII because the parties did not raise a 
constitutional question, the Court’s distinction between attaining and maintaining a 
balanced work force is applicable to the issue at hand.  See id. at 622 (explaining that 
the EEOC’s challenged plan had an eventual goal of thirty-six percent female 
representation). 
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imposed for the disparate impact provision if its intended purpose is 
diversity.  There is, however, some lack of clarity with Justice 
O’Connor’s statement.  First, it is not clear whether Justice O’Connor 
contemplated a twenty-five year durational limit or a fifty year limit 
because of her reference to Justice Powell’s approval of diversity in 
Bakke, which occurred twenty-five years before Grutter.322  Second, it is 
unclear whether Justice O’Connor would expect a similar limit for 
race-conscious programs designed to advance other non-remedial 
interests, like providing role models, meeting occupational needs, 
and providing equal employment opportunities.   
Assuming that Justice O’Connor’s expectation also applies to non-
remedial goals, it is necessary to assess whether the disparate impact 
provision complies with the twenty-five year or fifty year durational 
limit.  In the circumstance of race-conscious admissions programs, a 
school’s compliance with the durational limit set by Justice O’Connor 
could easily be determined from the date of an admissions program’s 
application.  For the disparate impact provision, there are three ways 
to measure its compliance with Justice O’Connor’s durational limit:  
using the year when the Court adopted the disparate impact theory, 
when the EEOC established the four-fifths rule, or when Congress 
promulgated the disparate impact provision.   
If one measures the disparate impact provision’s compliance with 
the time limit from the year the Court began applying the disparate 
impact theory in Griggs (1971),323 the provision has exceeded Justice 
O’Connor’s twenty-five year durational limit.  Similarly, if one uses 
the four-fifths rule’s passage date (1978),324 the provision again would 
fail the twenty-five year durational limit.  If, however, one uses the 
year of the provision’s congressional passage (1991),325 the provision 
would be in compliance until the year 2016.  If one applies the fifty 
year durational limit, the disparate impact provision would be in 
compliance regardless of the method of measurement. 
VII. NECESSITY AND RACE-NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES  
A. The Importance of Race-Neutral Alternatives 
To demonstrate that the use of racial classifications is necessary, 
the government must show the unavailability or ineffectiveness of 
                                                 
 322. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343. 
 323. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 324. See supra text accompanying note 48.  
 325. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A) (2006). 
NGOV.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 2/24/2011  5:39 PM 
584 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:535 
race-neutral alternatives to achieve its goal.326  Croson required the 
government to exhaust race-neutral alternatives before resorting to 
racial classifications.327  In Croson, the city failed to consider any race-
neutral alternatives.328  It seemed logical to the Court that the city 
should have investigated race-neutral alternatives because the city 
cited many race neutral barriers to minority participation.  The Court 
suggested race-neutral alternatives, such as city financing for small 
firms if Minority Business Enterprises disproportionately lacked 
capital,329 “increas[ing] the accessibility of city contracting 
opportunities to small entrepreneurs of all races[,]” and also 
“[s]implification of bidding procedures, relaxation of bonding 
requirements, and training and financial aid for disadvantaged 
entrepreneurs of all races.”330 
Although Grutter did “not require exhaustion of every conceivable 
race-neutral alternative,”331 it held that “[n]arrow tailoring does, 
however, require serious, good faith consideration of workable race-
neutral alternatives.”332  Later in Parents Involved, the plurality 
reiterated Grutter’s requirement to examine race-neutral alternatives 
and criticized the districts for failing to make such considerations.333  
In contrast, the programs in Sheet Metal Workers and Paradise were 
narrowly tailored because there were no other alternatives to the 
race-conscious programs.  In Sheet Metal Workers, the Court approved 
of “stronger measures” because the district court had already 
considered alternative remedies in light of the union’s deliberate 
                                                 
 326. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339 (“Narrow tailoring does, however, require serious, 
good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives . . . .”); Robinson, 
supra note 212, at 285 (construing the Court’s rejection of racial classification in 
Parents Involved as a result of “the plans’ limited impact” that “indicated that 
alternative approaches would accomplish the same goals,” and was thus not narrowly 
tailored). 
 327. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (reasoning 
that the set-aside program was not narrowly tailored because there were multiple 
race-neutral alternatives that could lead to greater minority participation in the 
construction industry). 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. at 509–10. 
 331. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339.  The Court’s relaxation of narrow tailoring was 
perhaps due to a presumption of good faith on the part of the school.  See id. at 329 
(“Our conclusion that the Law School has a compelling interest in a diverse student 
body is informed by our view that attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of 
the Law School’s proper institutional mission, and that ‘good faith’ on the part of a 
university is ‘presumed’ absent ‘a showing to the contrary.’”).  
 332. Id. at 339. 
 333. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 735 
(2007) (plurality opinion) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339). 
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delays in carrying out the district court’s initial remedial order.334  
Because of similar “foot dragging” in Paradise, the Court also found 
that the lower court adequately considered other alternatives.335  In 
both Paradise and Sheet Metal Workers, the proposed alternatives fell 
short of addressing the long term, pervasive discrimination caused by 
the government.336  Thus, when the government uses racial 
classifications, it must at least show it has considered race-neutral 
alternatives.   
B. Race-Neutral Alternatives for the Disparate Impact Provision’s Racial 
Classifications 
The disparate impact provision’s racial classifications may not be 
narrowly tailored if there are neutral alternatives available.  
Consideration of the availability of neutral alternatives depends on 
the compelling purpose for the provision’s use of race.  If the 
provision is intended to remedy past discrimination, there are 
possible alternatives to explore such as providing preparatory testing 
materials,337 training,338 or financial aid.339  If the compelling purpose 
of the provision is to increase diversity or provide equal 
opportunities, those same alternatives could be explored.  
Additionally, sensitivity training could be provided to promote the 
cross-racial understanding that is believed to derive from diversity.340   
Perhaps the one compelling interest where there is no available 
race-neutral alternative is meeting an operational need.  An employer 
is most likely to show the unavailability of race-neutral alternatives 
when race-conscious decisions are made for authenticity, such as 
                                                 
 334. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 481 
(1986). 
 335. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 174–78 (1987) (“Not only was the 
immediate promotion of blacks to the rank of corporal essential, but, if the need for 
continuing judicial oversight was to end, it was also essential that the Department be 
required to develop a procedure without adverse impact on blacks, and that the 
effect of past delays be eliminated.”). 
 336. Id. at 171; Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 481. 
 337. The firefighters in Ricci were required to purchase their own test materials, 
which cost approximately $500.  Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2667 (2009). 
 338. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509–10 (1989) 
(plurality opinion) (suggesting training as an alternative). 
 339. See id. at 510 (suggesting financial aid as an alternative).  In Griggs, the 
employer funded two-thirds of the tuition costs for high school training.  Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).  
 340. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (discussing the benefits of 
diversity in the educational context, such as breaking down racial stereotypes, 
fostering empathy and understanding for those of different races, encouraging 
livelier class room discussion, and preparing students for diverse workforces). 
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conducting investigations to infiltrate a racial gang, as Justice Stevens 
has contemplated.341  
This discussion is not meant to suggest that there are easy cures for 
the ills that the disparate impact provision’s racial classifications are 
meant to address.  But there must be evidence that the government 
has considered alternatives before imposing the provision’s racial 
classifications on employers.  
VIII. THE SURVIVAL OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT PROVISION  
The survival of the disparate impact provision against an Equal 
Protection Clause challenge rests upon whether the provision’s use of 
racial classifications functions like rigid quotas, is flexible and affords 
individualized decisions, is overinclusive or underinclusive, is 
temporary in duration, and is necessary in light of good faith 
considerations of race-neutral alternatives.  The disparate impact 
provision fails the narrow tailoring requirement under all these 
criteria. 
 The provision’s four-fifths rule risks being labeled a quota.  
Legislative history reveals that the predominant concern with the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, which codified disparate impact and its 
predecessor, was this very issue of the Act being a “quota bill.”342  The 
analysis in this Article does not rely on those generalized fears 
expressed during the passage of the Act but rather on the 
functionality of the four-fifths rule that was overlooked during the 
two years of debates preceding the Act.  It is difficult to distinguish 
the four-fifths rule from a quota because it effectively insulates a 
percentage of applicants from competition and uses race as the only 
factor in determining prima facie violations, which is antithetical to 
the characteristics of the permissible goal in Grutter.  
If the disparate impact provision is a quota, it will naturally fail the 
requirement for flexibility or individualized decisions that the Court 
has favored as permissible goals.  The provision lacks the flexibility of 
the goals in Grutter, Paradise, Sheet Metal Workers, and Harvard’s 
program that was endorsed by Bakke.  The provision, specifically the 
four-fifths rule, does not fluctuate with the needs of the employer or 
                                                 
 341. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 314 (1986) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  The Fifth Circuit has approved of using race as a basis of assignment for 
undercover agents.  See Perez v. FBI, 707 F. Supp. 891, 912 (W.D. Tex. 1988), aff’d 
956 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that “Title VII may not prohibit the Bureau 
from assigning Hispanic Special Agents to undercover work in disproportionate 
numbers”). 
 342. 137 CONG. REC. 30633 (Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Mazzoli). 
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the compelling interest sought to be achieved by the provision.  
Whether the objective of the provision is to remedy past 
discrimination, smoke out discrimination, increase diversity, provide 
role models, meet an operational need, or eliminate unnecessary and 
arbitrary barriers to employment, the four-fifths rule is constant.   
The provision’s inflexibility affects its ability to provide the type of 
individualized decisions that were critical in the Court’s approval of 
Grutter and invalidation of Gratz.  Whether a plaintiff has a prima 
facie case of disparate impact against an employer is determined on 
the basis of race alone and does not include a “holistic” review of the 
case.  
Additionally, the provision is not narrowly tailored in duration or 
scope.  Regardless of the compelling interest that may justify racial 
classifications, the Court has insisted that such classifications be 
temporary.  The disparate impact provision does not provide sunset 
provisions or indicate “a logical stopping point.”   
The provision’s four-fifths rule also potentially suffers from being 
overinclusive and underinclusive, which affects evaluation of its 
scope.  Assuming that researchers took into consideration the four-
fifths rule’s allowance for sample size and statistical significance, the 
rule’s susceptibility to false positive and false negative errors could 
lead to under-enforcement of the provision when an adverse impact 
exists and over-enforcement when an adverse impact does not exist.  
Governmental racial classifications that are overinclusive or 
underinclusive undermine the necessity of the classifications and 
suggest that other alternatives are available.  
Finally, the provision’s racial classifications must be necessary to 
achieving its compelling interest, which depends on consideration of 
race-neutral alternatives.  Of the six compelling interests identified 
earlier, only in one circumstance would the provision’s racial 
classifications be necessary to achieve its objective.  If there is a 
compelling need to use racial classifications for authenticity such as 
for investigative purposes, race-neutral alternatives would not be 
available.  The availability of race-neutral alternatives for the other 
possible compelling interests would negate the disparate impact 
provision’s justified reliance upon racial classifications.  
CONCLUSION 
Justice Scalia warned in Ricci that “the war between disparate 
impact and equal protection will be waged sooner or later, and it 
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behooves us to begin thinking about how—and on what terms—to 
make peace between them.”343  The purpose of this Article has been 
to analyze the disparate impact provision under the doctrinal 
demands of strict scrutiny and equal protection to determine if peace 
is possible, rather than to predict the outcome of future cases or 
make normative arguments.   
In my earlier work, I explored the compelling interests that might 
justify the disparate impact provision’s racial classifications.   
I preliminarily concluded that the removal of barriers to achieve 
equal employment opportunities is the most promising compelling 
interest that might bring peace between the disparate impact 
provision and the Equal Protection Clause.344  This Article completes 
the analysis necessary to answer the question posed by Justice Scalia 
by addressing the second prong of strict scrutiny—narrow tailoring.  
While remedying past discrimination, smoking out discrimination, 
enhancing diversity, providing role models, satisfying operational 
need, and providing equal employment opportunities may be 
laudable goals, the disparate impact provision’s means of achieving 
them are inadequate to satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement.  An 
inability to show that the disparate impact provision’s means fit its 
ends may, in fact, be fatal when “the evil day” comes.  
 
                                                 
 343. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2683 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 344. See Ngov, supra note 19, at 89. 
